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This practice-led project aims to explore how painting can address nostalgia 
through a rhizomatic exploration of memory and affect. Instead of defining a static 
identity for nostalgia, this project explores its potential of creating new ideas and 
affective movements by making connections with other memories and objects.  
 
By using nostalgia as the subject of painting, the painting can take initiative in 
directing the nostalgic experience by directly addressing it. In this way, the 
nostalgic experience is provided with a new direction led by painting’s practical 
logic which cannot be totally controlled by the painter. This means, in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s words, painting can deterritorialise a nostalgic experience and 
move it into other territories. The aim of painting is to find what Simon O’Sullivan 
defines as encounter in which it would be ruptured by the encountered territory 
first and then achieves new state through reterritorialisation.  
 
Photographs can directly articulate with paint by being incorporated into the 
painted surface or replacing the canvas. Accordingly, painting nostalgia can be 
linked with the encounters between the photographer and the subjects, hence, 
new ideas can be generated. Painting becomes a channel through which 
nostalgic experiences are separated from the desire to go back to the past and 
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This practice-led research project explores how painting can address nostalgia 
through a rhizomatic exploration of memory and affect. I grew up in China and 
completed my Bachelor and Master’s degree in Scotland majoring painting. 
Painting for me is a means of transformation that turns an invisible idea, concept, 
or emotion into a visible image. While viewers can find new affective experiences 
by viewing the image, the painter’s original idea or emotion could be changed 
through handling paints and other relevant materials. Travelling between two 
cultural realms, my memory and painting practice are often ruptured by the rapid 
changes of environments. I have to juggle with heterogeneous elements from the 
two cultural realms such as different physical environments and different 
viewpoints on the relationships between painting practice and the painter’s 
thoughts and ideas. This juggling can be difficult, and my previous emotional 
states or ideas often come into my present to haunt me. As a result, nostalgia has 
been my main research interest for a long time. However, I found it difficult to turn 
nostalgia into unforeseeable images, thoughts, and emotions with painting. 
Painting a nostalgic experience might easily fall into the path of reducing the 
nostalgic experience into a static scene and then use painting to visualise it. As 
will be further discussed in Chapter Two: Methodology, this is what Barbara Bolt 
defines as representationalism (2004) and it separates the painting and the 
nostalgic experience by making them into a strict binary in which the nostalgic 
experience is the content and the painting is its visual representation. Painting in 
this way can only be a means of depicting what is concluded from the nostalgic 
experience rather than participating in the nostalgic experience’s development.  
 
In order to transcend representationalism in painting nostalgia, the rhizome 
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philosophy established by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in their Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia (1972-1980) project is used as a main tactic. As the two 
philosophers point out, a rhizome has features such as connectability, 
heterogeneity, multiplicity and developing in unforeseen ways (1996: 7-10). 
Rhizomatic painting practice means that heterogeneous elements such as paints, 
intentions, memories and emotions are being connected in an unforeseeable way. 
As the result of the connections is unpredictable, the painting cannot be the 
representation of a predetermined image or idea. Therefore, with rhizome 
philosophy as the tactic, painting can be a means of manipulating the becoming 
of a nostalgic experience.  
 
Nostalgia is a common psychological phenomenon that often carries negative 
implications. Professor Janelle Wilson of University of Minnesota Duluth points 
out, many pundits and scholars associate nostalgia with reactionary thought 
(2005: 7). Media artist and novelist Svetlana Boym also indicates,  
 
Nostalgia is something of a bad word, an affectionate insult at best…... The 
word nostalgia is frequently used dismissively. “Nostalgia …… is essentially 
history without guilt. Heritage is something that suffuses us with pride rather 
than with shame,” writes Michael Kammen. Nostalgia in this sense is an 
abdication of personal responsibility, a guilt-free homecoming, an ethical and 
aesthetic failure. (Boym, 2001: xv) 
 
However, leading psychological research argues that nostalgia has positive 
functions such as solidifying and augmenting identity, regenerating and 
sustaining a sense of meaning, and buttressing and invigorating social 
connectedness (Sedikides, Wildschut, Baden. 204: 206-207). Instead of defining 
it as positive or negative, it might be more appropriate to say that nostalgia is an 




Apart from being a tactic for transcending representationalism in painting, 
rhizome philosophy can also be a basic perspective for looking at objects such 
as memory and nostalgia. As a painter who grew up in China and trained in the 
UK, my memory is comprised of heterogeneous elements from the two cultural 
realms that I have experienced. From a rhizomatic perspective, these elements 
are constantly forming new connections in an unforeseeable way. These 
connections change as I experience different environments and circumstances 
and some of these connections become my nostalgic experiences. From a 
rhizomatic perspective, nostalgia is the result of the connection between memory 
and present environments rather than a static image of the past.  
 
Therefore, with rhizome philosophy, painting nostalgia becomes a practice of 
breaking binaries (e.g. the one between the present and the past and the one 
between facts and imaginations) and creating new objects. The act of painting, 
or handling paints, plays a leading role in this practice. 
 
Based on the theories of philosophers and artists such as Gilles Deleuze, Félix 
Guattari, Barbara Bolt and Simon O’Sullivan, nostalgia in this project is 
conceptualised as a particular process in a person’s nonstop affective and 
psychological movement rather than a static picture of the past that person longs 
for. Painting a nostalgic experience can be seen as a task of handling this process 
in affective and psychological movement through handling paints. The practice in 
this project is non-representational which means that the practice is not 
conducted to realise a predetermined blueprint or prototype. The aim of painting 
a nostalgic experience is what Simon O’Sullivan defines as an encounter 
(O’Sullivan, 2006: 1) which means the unexpected finding through the rupture 




From the material perspective, a key of practice in this project is the use of 
photographs in painting. Photographs have two main roles in this project. They 
can be used to trigger the painter’s nostalgic experience and as the visual 
representations of some objects in the painter’s nostalgic reverie. By making a 
painting directly on selected photographs, the trigger or representation of the 
nostalgic reverie is visually changed. The memories and affects triggered by 
perceiving the painted photographs would be shifted accordingly. The nostalgic 
experience that the painter is having could be ruptured by doing so, and the 
painting becomes the means of shifting the memory and affect triggering until the 
painter’s mind encounters some new thoughts or affective states. By using 
photographs in painting, the questions: what can painting do to nostalgic 
experience; and what can nostalgic experience do to painting? are explored.  
 
The thesis is divided into four chapters. Chapter One: Literature Review outlines 
the theoretical contexts that the practice is based on. It is comprised of three 
discussions. Firstly, the definition of nostalgia and the distinction between a 
nostalgic experience and a nostalgic reverie based on the analysis of the 
researches of neuroscientists and psychologists such as Sean Watson (1998), 
Constantine Sedikides (2008), Tim Wildschut (2004) and Zhao Jingrong (2005). 
Secondly, the philosophy of rhizome and de-and-reterritorialisation of Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari (1987) is introduced and discussed. Together with the 
theory of encounter by Simon O’Sullivan (2006), these philosophies function as 
the tactics (Bolt, 2004) of achieving non-representational practice for painting in 
this project. Finally, by discussing the theories and works of practitioners and 
theorists such as Barbara Bolt (2004), James Elkins (2000), André Bazin (1960), 
Roland Barthes (1999) and Saul Leiter (1950), the understandings of painting 
and photography in this project are indicated. 
 
Chapter Two: Methodology lays out this project’s research methodology which is 
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non-representational rhizomatic practice. Based on some of the discussions in 
Chapter One: Literature Review, Chapter Two discusses the definition of 
representationalism and the tactic of using rhizomatic practice to transcend it. It 
also indicates the new knowledge that this project seeks to produce and analyses 
its relationships with painting in this project. 
 
Chapter Three: Practice Analysis discusses three practical projects that I made 
during the PhD research. The Barnes Series is a series of paintings that started 
with material experiments. The analysis of it focuses on what can handling 
materials such as paints and photographs do to the painter’s nostalgic experience. 
Wish You Were Here 100 is a collection of one hundred paintings that were made 
with a set boundary in visual forms. It explored what a repeated form can do to a 
person’s nostalgic experiences. The Labyrinth was a work made based on the 
experiences of the two previous projects. With non-representational rhizomatic 
practice, the painting took the painter’s mind through a series of changes from a 
nostalgic reverie to several other affective states. The discussion of it focuses on 
how painting and nostalgia mutually change each other. 
 
The thesis is accompanied by a portfolio which includes visual documentations 
of the works from these three projects. When certain work is discussed in Chapter 
Three, the corresponding page number in the portfolio would be indicated so that 
readers can find the images of the work in the portfolio. The portfolio also includes 
images of a proposed viva exhibition of my works. This proposed viva exhibition 
was due to take place in the Barnes Building of the Glasgow School of Art in 
March 2020, it did not restrict to the works from the three projects which are 
discussed in Chapter Three, some works from other projects were also included. 
By breaking the works’ original arranging orders and rearranging the pieces into 
a new entity, the senses that the works were isolated pieces, made in a linear 
chronological order, were also broken. The new entity was created based on my 
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memory at the moment. This means that some different parts of my memories 
(i.e. the memories of making the works and the nostalgic experiences that 
generated the works) were reinterpreted and new connections between them 
were made at the same time. Because it is created by connecting multiple 
heterogeneous fragments, the new piece could be seen as a rhizome on its own. 
It exists as an individual temporarily because it could be broken into pieces again 
for new connections. For me as the maker of the work, predetermining a meaning 
nor visual centre for the new formed piece is unnecessary. Viewing the work is 
an articulation between the work and the viewers’ memories, they find the 
elements that attract them and the viewing experience becomes a new channel 
of activating their memories.  
 
1.2 Actualisation, Memory and Nostalgia 
 
The seventh edition of Oxford dictionary defines nostalgia as a ‘wistful longing for 
a happier or better time in the past.’ (OED, 2012: 489) In this project, based on 
the theories of neuroscientists and psychologists such as Sean Watson, 
Constantine Sedikides, and Zhao Jingrong, nostalgia is discussed from two 
perspectives, the nostalgic reverie and the nostalgic experience. When being 
referred to as nostalgic reverie, it means the image of the past that the person 
longs for. As will be further discussed below, this image is an assemblage of a 
person’s actualisations from several aspects such as memory, affect and her/his 
present circumstances. By contrast, a nostalgic experience means the entire 
experiential process of a person dealing with a nostalgic reverie.  
 
Having a nostalgic experience is seen as a process of the person’s memory or 
duration and the nostalgic reverie assembled through de-and-reterritorialisation. 
This will be discussed in detail in Section 1.3 and 1.4 and is based on Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s philosophy of rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) 
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which sees everything as an unstable and centreless assemblage that is always 
in motion of encountering other assemblages. Therefore, painting a nostalgic 
experience becomes a task of handling the process of assemblage from a visual 
and material perspective. As handling paints has a logic of its own which cannot 
be totally controlled by the painter (Bolt, 2004), painting a nostalgic experience 
means that the nostalgic experience is given a new perspective of becoming. 
Accordingly, the nostalgic experience, which is primarily a personal psychological 
development that concerns the person’s memory and affect, can become 
something visually communicable that has the potential of forming connections 
between elements such as memory, affect, paints, photographs and other people. 
As Simon O’Sullivan points out that connections might be understood as a key 
modality of creativity (2006: 17), painting a nostalgic experience could be a 
channel of creating new thoughts and ideas. 
 
Painting a nostalgic reverie and painting a nostalgic experience are two 
fundamentally different tasks. The former aims to depict, or represent an image 
in the person’s mind whereas the latter does not have any predetermined 
direction and aim to follow and achieve. With the latter practice as the method, 
and what Simon O’Sullivan defines as encounter (2006: 1) as the objective of the 
practice, this project aims to answer the question of how painting can address 
nostalgia through a rhizomatic exploration of memory and affect. 
 
The theory of actualisation pointed out by Sean Watson (1998) indicates how a 
person starts a nostalgic experience. In analysing the twin concepts of the virtual 
and actual, Watson stresses that we must guard against any kind of Kantianism 
and Cartesianism as they are both tightly linked with binaries which stymie our 
perception and connection with the world. He points out that in Kantianism the 
world in-itself is virtual therefore the actual is the phenomenological experience 
that takes place somewhere removed from the real world. In Cartesianism the 
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virtual is the material world outside, and the actual is a mysterious, immaterial, 
representation of that world for the ‘eyes’ of an equally mysterious, immaterial, 
‘cogito’ within (Watson, 1998). Watson argues that, the virtual is the totality of the 
material universe in all its unfathomable complexity and analyses the relationship 
between the virtual and actual: 
 
Both the ‘virtual’ and the ‘actual’ are as real and solid and material as one 
another. The latter is effectively a subset of the former; a subtraction from 
the total, the total which Deleuze sometimes refers to as ‘the Absolute’. The 
world as ‘actualised’ in consciousness is that aspect of the world which is 
of enough interest to the organism for it to connect its sensory-motor circuits 
in such a way that a consciousness is actualised. (Watson, 1998) 
 
Deleuze makes the similar argument in discussing how we perceive things and 
suggests that there is no distinction between phenomenon and thing-in-itself. He 
suggests ‘we perceive things where they are, perception puts us at once into 
matter’ (1991:25). Accordingly, even the distinction between ‘I’ and the outside 
world becomes questionable, because perceiving in this sense also means 
merging. However, that does not mean that all aspects and elements of the 
perceived entity can enter the person’s consciousness during a perception, as 
Deleuze also points out that, ‘by virtue of the cerebral interval, in effect, a being 
can retain from the material object and the actions issuing from it only those 
elements that interest him … it is not the object plus something, but the object 
minus something, minus everything that does not interest us’ (Deleuze, 1991:24-
25). Based on this argument, Watson concludes that, it is a machine comprised 
of the brain and nervous system that actualises consciousness by selecting from 
the brain and nervous system comprise a machine which, amongst other things, 
actualises consciousness by selecting, from this totality, that which is of relevance 
for the conscious exercise of will. (Watson, 1998) 
 
Memory plays a vital role in the selection which turns a totality into a 
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consciousness. According to the philosopher Henri Bergson philosophy, 
immediate conscious awareness of the present is always a contracted composite 
of sensation and memory. However, it should be stressed that to Bergson 
memory is not a storage in which the impressions of individual past events rest 
and wait to be triggered, rather, it is an entity formed by what the person has 
experienced. As Bergson himself puts it, ‘the following moment always contains, 
over and above the preceding one, the memory the latter has left it’ (Bergson, 
2007: 176). He thinks of time and consciousness in terms of duration (durée), 
which is a succession without distinction, an interpenetration of elements so 
heterogeneous that former states can never recur (Bergson, 2001: vii). Memory 
can be defined as a duration, hence, from the perspective of Bergson, everything 
that a person has experienced functions as a whole to face her/his present. 
Cognitive neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga also believes that memory functions 
as an undividable entity, as he discusses, ‘Everything in life is memory, save for 
the thin edge of the present.’ (Foster 2009:2) Therefore, memory could be seen 
as the particular state of the person. In Watson’s words, ‘We don’t have memories, 
we are memories; or at least we are duration, and memory is a function of 
duration.’ (Watson, 1998) 
 
The past in a nostalgic experience should not be seen as the re-presentation of 
selected documentation of bygone facts that are safely preserved in the person’s 
brain. Rather, as one’s memory is an entity which is always in motion and change, 
‘the past’ in nostalgia is an adjustment of this entity. In Bergson’s words, it is, 
 
a work of adjustment, something like the focusing of a camera. But our 
recollection still remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it 
by adopting the appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into view like a 
condensing cloud; from the virtual state it passes into the actual. (Bergson, 
2002: 125)  
 
In a nostalgic experience, as well as unconsciously influencing the person’s 
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selection in actualising the virtual into her/his consciousness, memory itself 
functions as a totality of its own, which through selection can form a reverie and 
come into view. 
 
Psychologists Constantine Sedikides, Tim Wildschut, and Denise Baden point out 
that the core of a nostalgic experience is always the juxtaposition or comparison 
between the past and the present (Sedikides et al., 2004: 205-206). This idea 
implies a linear view of time as it sees the past and the present as separated 
moments. However, based on the idea that memory is a duration, I would argue 
that, as ‘the past’ (i.e. the nostalgic reverie) that the person longs for is actually 
the person’s actualised present. Therefore, the core of a nostalgic experience is 
a confusion between an illusion of the past and the present. This implies that 
there is no strict distinction between the person and the outside world as apart 
from her/his memory, the person’s present also includes her/his present 
circumstances. The virtual or totality from which a nostalgic reverie is the mixture 
of the person’s memory, affect and the circumstances that she/he is in. 
 
In discussing the negative effects of nostalgia, psychotherapist Roderick Peters 
indicates that, a nostalgic experience could be ‘an overwhelming craving that 
persists and profoundly interferes with the individual’s attempts to cope with his 
present circumstances.’ (Peters, 1985: 135) From this perspective, a nostalgic 
experience could mean that a person creates a reverie which functions as an 
alternative situation which they would rather be in, compared to her/his present 
situation, enabling the desire of escaping the present. Wildschut et al.’s research 
offers an explanation to this desire, as they point out the most common triggers 
of nostalgia are negative emotional states such as loneliness and sadness, and 
nostalgia can be a redemption through which the person compensates the 
negative affect (i.e. the triggers of nostalgia) and regains an emotional 
satisfactory state (2006: 975-978). In fact, a large number of laboratory and 
20 
 
autobiographical memory studies have demonstrated that there is an 
unbreakable link between emotion and memory, with emotion playing vital roles 
in various aspects of memory such as encoding, storage, and reconstruction 
(Bradley, M. M.; Greenwald, M. K.; Petry, M. C.; Lang, P. J., 1992: 379-390; 
Hamann, S.B., 2001: 394-309; Christianson, S. A., 1992: 284-309). Therefore, as 
an actualised memory which acts on the person’s emotion, nostalgia is, in Zhao 
Jingrong’s word, more personal and emotional than reminiscence which primarily 
focuses on bygone facts, and the past in it is beautified and imagined rather than 
the reappearance of the bygone events (Zhao, 2005: 54-57). 
 
Psychologists have been exploring the nature of affect and emotion of nostalgia. 
Although Sedikides et al. describe nostalgia as a bittersweet emotion, they also 
discuss whether nostalgia is a positive or negative emotion (Sedikides et al., 2004: 
204-205). However, the distinction between affect and emotion made by the 
Canadian philosopher Brian Massumi implies that defining nostalgic experience 
as generally as positive or negative might be too general. As Massumi points out 
affect is the totality of emotional movement within the body, which could perhaps 
be thought of as virtual emotion. Emotion proper occurs when selection has taken 
place and the certainty of those affective movements have been assimilated into 
consciousness, given a name, and placed within a narrative which makes them 
meaningful (I am angry because … etc.) (Massumi, 1996: 226). 
 
In this sense, the emergence of an emotion within a memory is another 
perspective of actualisation. Being a duration, no previous state in a memory can 
be recurred (Bergson, 2001: vii). As the person’s memory is a main part of the 
virtual from which nostalgic reveries are actualised, it is indeed not likely for a 
person to have two exact same nostalgic experiences. It is due to this that 
psychologist Zhao Jongrong argues that nostalgic experiences are non-
repeatable (Zhao, 2005: 57). Therefore, defining whether a nostalgic emotion is 
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positive or negative should be based on the specific experience. The cases in 
which the nostalgic emotions are positive and, as Harvey Kaplan puts it, 
‘producing an air of infatuation and a feeling of elation’ (Kaplan, 1987: 465) and 
the opposite situations in which nostalgic experience are, as Joel Best, Edward 
Nelson, and Dan Hertz argue, immersed in sadness, as the nostalgic individual 
realises that the past is irredeemably lost (Best and Nelson, 1985: 221-233; Hertz, 
1990: 189-198) are not in contradiction with each other. How the next nostalgic 
experience might affect the person is unpredictable. It might be enjoyable, 
through which the person gains emotionally satisfactory state, but it could also be 
‘an overwhelming craving that persists and profoundly interferes with the 
individual’s attempts to cope with his present circumstances’, therefore negative. 
(Peters, 1985: 135) 
 
As discussed above, a nostalgic reverie is actualised from a virtual which includes 
the person’s memory, affect and her/his circumstances. The process of dealing 
with it (i.e. the nostalgic experience) enriches the person’s virtual repository by 
becoming her/his memories. Its status of being an individual process in the 
present only exists temporarily, for any recall of it in the future would be a selected 
and adjustment of the person’s memory as a whole. It is non-repeatable, and its 
meaning can only be defined in actualisations in the future, as Eugene W. Holland 
says in discussing Deleuze’s philosophy of time:  
 
Not only is the present only one actualisation among many, but its relation 
to the past is not exhausted or determined in its actualisation alone: its 
relation to the past will have been determined by future actualisations, each 
of which successively alters the relations between the present and its 
relevant pass. (Holland, 2013: 20) 
 
Therefore, the question of what a memory can become is more significant than 




1.3 Rhizomatic Thinking 
 
Based on the discussion of Section 1.2, exploring nostalgia with painting should 
guard against the binary opposition between an internal phenomenal experience 
and the external world. In A Thousand Plateaus (1987), Deleuze and Guattari 
point out that binary logic could lead to a static mode of thinking which stymies 
creativity, as they indicate, ‘binary logic is the spiritual reality of the root-tree.’ 
(1987: 5) The image of a tree is as a firm and static structure however it does 
imply several binary relationships including between the singular cause (i.e. the 
seed) and the effect (i.e. the tree), the tree as subject and other trees, and the 
tree’s primary elements (e.g. the trunk) and the secondary aspects (e.g. the 
branches and leaves). When using the tree symbol as a mode of thinking, the 
subject, no matter what is it, is being broken into pieces and reconstructed into 
such a structure as it is predetermined. Therefore, examining nostalgia with tree-
structured thinking requires constructing an explicit causal relationship between 
individual elements (e.g. memory, affect, consciousness, nostalgic reverie). With 
finding the single truth such as the cause or meaning of it as the aim, these 
elements might be organised into a static structure which can then be used to 
explain all nostalgic experiences. In other words, with tree-structured thinking, an 
analysis of nostalgia uncovers what the nostalgic experience is and what it means. 
Through predetermining that there is only one right answer to the question, it 
stymies, rather than fosters thoughts. 
 
In order to supplant tree-structured thinking, Deleuze and Guattari established 
rhizomatic thinking. A rhizome is a plant stem that grows horizontally underground, 
sending out roots and shoots, it has ‘neither beginning nor end, but always a 
middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overspills.’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 21) However, this middle (milieu) should not be seen as a centre. Rather, 
it means that a rhizome is always in a phase of becoming rather than being a 
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static structure. In fact, Simon O’Sullivan indicates, within such a rhizome, there 
is no centre or any central organising motif, and through the non-hierarchical 
connections between individual nodal points, it fosters transversal connections 
and communications between heterogeneous locations and events (2006: 12). 
Therefore, a rhizome is a system that is constantly shifting, in which all ‘truth’ and 
identities, as well as the relationships between them are temporarily formed. 
Therefore, unlike tree-structured thinking which orders the subjects in a 
determined way, with rhizomatic thinking, there is always a sense of ambiguity as 
everything is shifting.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari did not create a binary of right and wrong between tree-
structured thinking and rhizomatic thinking, rather, the difference between the two 
approaches, as Damian Sutton and David Martin-Jones point out is through 
considering a tree in a forest. In their words:  
 
In the forest there is no single truth, no singular cause and effect, no one 
‘true’ tree. Rather, the forest is a single entity made up of numerous trees, 
or, numerous ‘truths.’ It is also impossible to posit one origin to a forest, and 
not simply because you cannot tell which tree came first. Any one tree is a 
product of an assemblage, of water, sunlight and soil, without which there 
would be no trees at all, regardless of whether a seed exists or not. (Sutton 
and Martin-Jones, 2008: 4) 
 
Therefore, from a rhizomatic perspective, a person (or any other subject) can be 
defined from at least three perspectives. While being an entity on their own, 
she/he is also an assemblage of many others, therefore a person as a ‘one’ is 
always a part of another bigger assemblage. Even from a static viewpoint, nothing 
has a certain identity or definition and a slight change in perspective could lead 
to the emergence of new meanings and understandings of the subject. More 
importantly, multiplicity is only one of the features of a rhizome as it is also 
essentially heterogeneous with high connectability. As Deleuze and Guattari say, 
‘a rhizome ceaselessly establishes connection among semiotic chains, 
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organisations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and 
social struggles (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 7).’ Based on these features, 
Eugene W. Holland points out that, there is no place for ontology in 
Deleuzoguattarian philosophy, as the fundamental question of their philosophy is 
not the definitive ‘What is it?’ but an open-ended ‘What can become of it?’ 
(Holland, 2013: 54)  
 
As a nostalgic reverie is formed by the undividable connections between 
heterogeneous elements such as the person’s memory, affect, imagination and 
her/his present circumstances and none of these elements could be defined as 
the centre, the nostalgic reverie can be seen as a rhizome on its own. Hence, the 
nostalgic experience (i.e. the process of dealing with the nostalgic reverie) is 
rhizomatic. Accordingly, this research focuses on what this rhizomatic becoming 
can achieve, rather than turning this rhizomatic becoming into a tree structure. 
On a practical level, using a nostalgic experience as the subject of painting means 
that the painter is directly intervening or handling the nostalgic experience’s 
becoming from a visual and material perspective. Materials such as paints and 
photographs hence become new heterogeneous elements that join the 
rhizomatic connections of the nostalgic experience. In this way, while the painter’s 
memory and affect are shifted by handling painting and photographs, these 
physical materials and the thoughts about them could also be shifted by the 
triggered memory and affect. Simon O’Sullivan suggests that new ideas and 
thoughts can be created through rhizomatic connections (2006: 17), and this 
brings up the idea of de-and-reterritorialisation which will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
1.4 De-and-Reterritorialisation and Encounter 
 
By illustrating how a wasp becomes a piece in the orchid’s reproductive 
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apparatus through deterritorialisation while the orchid is deterritorialised and 
formed an image by tracing a wasp (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 10), Deleuze 
and Guattari illustrate the movements of de-and-reterritorialisation. As they 
indicate, the two movements are inseparable which happen during the 
encounters between entities (or in other words, rhizomes). Every 
deterritorialisation is accompanied by a reterritorialisation. Through 
deterritorialisation, an entity’s ‘original territory’ (i.e. the identity) is ruptured, and 
through the accompanying reterritorialisation, the ruptured entity consolidates 
with elements of the other entity (or entities) that it encounters and forms a 
developed new territory which achieves stability. There is an assemblage created 
in every encounter, and this means that a de-and-reterritorialisation leads to a 
double becoming for both sides of the encounter. As a result, heterogeneous 
entities could be assembled into a rhizome through this double becoming led by 
de-and-reterritorialisation. Therefore, these two coexisting movements sustain a 
sense of stability while fostering the chaotic becoming between entities. 
 
As discussed in Section 1.3, the nodal points (i.e. the heterogeneous objects that 
form the rhizome) within a rhizome are constantly making new connections. 
These constantly changing connections make the rhizome a shifting pattern and 
create a ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9) along which the rhizome 
can move into (and onto) new territories and achieve de-and-reterritorialisation. 
As a nostalgic experience is a phase of the person’s becoming, and becoming 
can be seen as a duration which is an undividable process of developing in which 
the previous states cannot be recurred (Bergson, 2001: vii), the nostalgic 
experience’s identity as an individual must be temporary as it will eventually 
become a psychological state that can never recur.   
 
Therefore, from the perspective of de-and-reterritorialisation, a nostalgic reverie 
can be seen as a territory or rhizome which is formed through actualising the 
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person’s present virtual (i.e. the mixture of the person’s memory, her/his affect 
and she/he present circumstances). Despite that it is largely generated from the 
person’s own existing territory, as discussed in Section 1.2, a nostalgic reverie is 
always new to the person as it is fundamentally non-repeatable. In this sense, a 
person having a nostalgic experience is like the encounter between two rhizomes 
(i.e. her/his duration and the nostalgic reverie). 
 
This means that the nostalgic reverie does not simply merge into the person’s 
duration, it is an assemblage between these two rhizomes. De-and-
reterritorialisation could happen during this process, as discussed in the research 
of Constantine Sedikides, Tim Wildschut, Jamie Arndt and Clay Routledge (2008: 
304) which indicates that based on observations of Swiss mercenaries in the 
service of European monarchs, throughout most of the 19th century, nostalgia 
was regarded as a medical disease with symptoms such as bouts of weeping, 
irregular heartbeat, and anorexia, suggesting that nostalgic reveries could 
deterritorialise a person’s stability on physical level. Therefore, a nostalgic 
experience can be concluded as a dynamic process: as a person perceives the 
moving world, a non-repeatable assemblage of multiple actualisations (i.e. the 
nostalgic reverie, which is a rhizome that formed by the person’s actualised 
memories, her/his actualised affect and the actualised environment that she/he 
is in) is generated from the person’s duration (another rhizome). Through 
mutually de-and-reterritorialisating each other, the two rhizomes could assemble 
into a new rhizome which is a new state of the person’s duration.  
 
As will be discussed in Chapter Two: Methodology, manipulating paints has its 
own logic of forming what Deleuze and Guattari define as a line of flight (1987: 9) 
along which the painter’s original ideas move into other areas. Therefore, painting 
a nostalgic experience means that the assemblage/double becoming between 
the nostalgic reverie and the person’s duration is being added with a new 
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direction (the act of painting) therefore the which this double becoming, which is 
a personal development, can be extended into the communicable visual territory.  
 
The question of what and how does the painting communicate is explored by this 
research. This is when the distinction between a nostalgic reverie and a nostalgic 
experience again becomes relevant. As stated in Section 1.1, a nostalgic reverie 
is considered as the assemblage of the person’s several actualisations, in other 
words, the nostalgic reverie is an image of the ‘past’ that the person longs for at 
the moment. By contrast, a nostalgic experience is defined as a process in which 
the person’s duration and the nostalgic reverie assemble through double 
becoming led by de-and-reterritorialisation. Therefore, from the painter’s 
perspective, when the subject is a nostalgic reverie, what the practice aims for 
might be something known, as the nostalgic reverie as an image must exist prior 
to the intention of making a painting of it. By contrast, with a nostalgic experience 
as the subject, two processes (i.e. the assemblage between the nostalgic reverie 
and the person’s duration and the process of handling paints) are interwoven 
together, and the painting does not have any concrete aim nor direction. However, 
this does not mean that painting would become an aimless wander. From the 
painter’s perspective, what marks the completion of the practice could be what 
Simon O’Sullivan defined as an encounter (2006: 1). 
 
In Art Encounter Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond Representation (2006), 
Simon O’Sullivan makes the distinction between an object of encounter and an 
object of recognition. As he says, an object of recognition is precisely a re-
presentation of something always already in place, and our knowledges, beliefs 
and values are reconfirmed with such an object. Such an object does not trigger 
thought as ‘representation precisely stymies thought’ (O’Sullivan, 2006: 1). By 
contrary, with an object of encounter, our habitual way of being and acting in the 
world are challenged, our systems of knowledge disrupted and we are forced to 
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think. As O’Sullivan puts it, 
 
The encounter then operates as a rupture in our habitual modes of being 
and thus in our habitual subjectivities. It produces a cut, a crack. However, 
this is not the end of the story, for the rupturing encounter also contains a 
moment of affirmation, the affirmation of a new world, in fact a way of seeing 
and thinking this world differently. This is the creative moment of the 
encounter that obliges us to think otherwise. Life, when it truly is lived, is a 
history of these encounters, which will always necessarily occur. 
(O’Sullivan, 2006: 1) 
 
Similar to the inseparability between deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation, 
rupture and affirmation are then two moments of the same encounter. In a 
nostalgic experience, the confusion between the past and present (see section 
1.2) implies that the painter’s habitual subjectivity is in a ruptured status 
already and she/he is in the process of achieving the affirmation of a new way 
of seeing and thinking her/his memories.  
 
Therefore, painting (i.e. handling paints) directs this process from a material 
and visual perspective. Barbara Bolt indicates that the painter cannot always 
have the control during the process of making a painting as handling paints 
has its own power to escape the painter’s conscious control and take on a life 
on its own (2006: 1). This power of handling paints is defined as the practical 
logic in this project. Led by such a logic, the painting does not have to follow a 
path predetermined by the painter. The completion or success of the painting 
is when the painter feels that through making the painting, she/he has reached 
a new psychological state in which she/he no longer longs for the nostalgic 




In Chapter 11, ‘The Painting Before Painting of Francis Bacon’ from The Logic of 
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Sensation, Deleuze writes: 
 
It is a mistake to think that the painting works on a white surface because 
now everything he (the painter) has in his head or around him is already in 
the canvas……so that the painter does not have to cover a blank surface, 
but rather would have to empty it out, clear out, clean it (Deleuze, 2017: 
61). 
 
From this perspective, a painting can be seen as the result of an actualisation for 
it is also a product of selection and adjustment. For example, when a painter 
paints a tree, all images of trees, including the ones that she/he has seen before 
and the ones that she/he can search for and observe, become a virtual or totality. 
In order to complete the task, the painter puts herself/himself into this virtual and 
makes the selection and adjustment through manipulating paint. As a result, the 
completed image of a tree means that all other alternatives have been cleared 
out. This clearing out theory does not only apply to the selection of subject matter. 
Even when a painter is facing a life model, she/he still needs to experience this 
clearing out on a technical level, as the life model can be painted in countless 
ways while for the painter at the moment, she/he needs to find the one that can 
be ‘right’ or ideal.  
 
However, this finding is not a linear task like to pick an existing one that fits the 
painter’s predetermined intention out of all methods that she/he has. Both 
Barbara Bolt (2004) and James Elkins (2000) argue that the act of handling paints 
can shift the painter’s thoughts and affect. Therefore, instead of a linear process 
of achieving the painter’s predetermined intention through handling paints, 
making a painting should be seen as a process of handling the connections 
between elements the painter’s intentions, the subject matters and the materials. 
In other words, making a painting is a rhizomatic process, and the ‘right’ or ideal 
way of making the painting is emerged through handling the connections between 




These examples indicate how it can be a struggle to make a painting, as from a 
material and visual perspective, the painted image is accomplished through the 
‘adding’ of paints and yet aims to achieve a kind of ‘subtraction’. However, the 
adding of paints in painting practice cannot be defined as an addition because 
the accumulation of marks and brushstrokes is 1+1+1=1 rather than 1+1+1=3. 
Therefore, the adding, or accumulation of paints in painting practice is more of an 
extension. From the first brushstroke to the moment when the painter can stop 
with satisfactory, the image is always a ‘one’ rather than a collection of marks. 
Hence, in order to extend the image, the following brushstroke needs to make 
the ‘right’ form that merges with rather than ruptures the existing image. 
 
Does the artist get to consciously decide what is the ‘right’ form for her/his next 
brushstroke? Mark Rothko’s statement seems to believe that the painter could 
have such a power, as he points out, the word subject in art has two meanings in 
artworks, the first one is ‘the recognisable elements in a picture, such as objects 
that we know, an anecdote we can recognise, a model that is familiar to us, or 
even some more remote association with our experience’, and the second 
meaning is ‘what the artist intends in the picture.’ (Rothko, 2006: 76) In this sense, 
Rothko concludes that the word subject is quite close to the word design. 
Accordingly, the painter’s conscious decision is being put in the leading position, 
as dealing with a subject means having a design, or blueprint to follow in this 
sense. 
 
However, James Elkins’ discussion on paint implies that, the painter’s ideas, or 
intentions might be challenged through her/his manipulation of paint, as he says:  
 
Paint incites motions, or the thought of motions, and through them it implies 
emotions and other wordless experiences. That is why painting is a fine art: 
not merely because it gives us trees and faces and lovely things to see, but 
because paint is a finely tuned antenna, reacting to every unnoticed 
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movement of the painter’s hand, fixing the faintest shadow of a thought in 
colour and texture. (Elkins, 2000: 188) 
 
Whatever the intention might be (e.g. depicting things, expressing emotions, 
exploring ideas), the painter must have some initiative in the painting. This 
intention, which is defined as the subject of the painting by Rothko, is realised 
through the manipulation of paint. What Elkins suggests is that manipulating paint 
as the means has a power, or logic of its own which reacts to the painter’s 
intentions. These two logics (i.e. the painter’s intention and the logic of practice) 
inseparably lead the process of a painting. In this sense, ‘thinking in painting’ 
must be practical, as Gerhard Richter says in his 1962 notes that: 
 
Painting has nothing to do with thinking, because in painting thinking is 
painting. Thinking is language – record-keeping – and has to take place 
before and after. Einstein did not think when he was calculating: he 
calculated – producing the next equation in reaction to the one that went 
before – just as in painting one form is a response to another, and so on. 
(Elger and Ulrich Obrist, 2009: 14) 
 
Therefore, as the following brushstroke is a response to the image formed by 
preceding marks, its ‘right’ form is decided by this existing image. From the 
perspective of actualisation, the existing image can therefore be seen as another 
layer of memory that influences the selection, or clearing out as Deleuze puts it, 
of the following brushstroke’s form. In fact, the process of painting can indeed be 
considered as a duration (Bergson, 2001: vii) just like memory as it is also cannot 
be divided into pieces and it is difficult to recur a state during a painting process. 
This new duration is generated from the painter’s intention and yet escapes from 
it with its own practical and material logics during its extension and starts to 
perform its own power. In discussing her own painting, Barbara Bolt describes 
this process as, ‘the painting takes a life of its own life. It breathes, vibrates, 
pulsates, shimmers and generally runs away from me.’ (Bolt, 2004: 1) Therefore, 
the process of painting naturally involves a kind of uncontrollability. Restricting 
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this uncontrollability and to lock the practice within the painter’s intention, or 
design, would make the practice representational, as the painting could seem to 
be decided by a predetermined prototype, model or schema. 
 
Therefore, the process of making a painting should not be seen as linear, as if it 
is a one-way journey from the painter’s intention to the finished work. As 
manipulating paint incites motion and the thoughts of motions which imply 
emotions and other wordless experiences (Elkins, 2000: 188), the process 
inevitably involves forces that run away from the painter’s conscious controls and 
head in their own direction. Therefore, the process is more like an expansion that 
goes off in many directions. The painter’s intention is the start, yet her/his 
conscious control is only one of the forces that fuel this expansion. 
 
James Elkins (2000) and Barbara Bolt (2004) imply that painting should not be 
divided into thinking and practice as the act of handling paints has its own logic 
and power which triggers or generates thinking. As a result, the centre of practice 
could become ambiguous as these thoughts and emotions generated from 
practice might function as ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9) that shifts 
the painter’s initial consciously made intentions with the painting into some 
unexpected directions. In other words, practice, or handling paint itself, has the 
potential to de-and-reterritorialise the painter’s initial intentions. Therefore, even 
started with a clear aim, the practice could still be centreless and result in 
something that the painter cannot totally foresee and control.   
 
In this sense, painting practice fundamentally has the feature of a rhizome. 
Seeing the relationship between the painter’s intention and the painting as an 
arborescent structure in which the painter’s intention being the singular cause 
and the finished work being the singular effect is a limited perspective, as it 
ignores all other ‘trees’ that grow from what practice sends out during the process. 
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Therefore, a finished painting can be seen as a rhizome that is made up of 
multiple mutual influencing arborescent structures such as the one started with 
the painter’s intentions and the ones started with the emotions and thoughts 
incited by practice (i.e. handling paint).  
 
Hence, although the artist’s intention starts the painting, it cannot be regarded as 
the singular cause of a painting, as causes which provide other directions in the 
painting’s expansion will be generated by the process. This means, the 
completion of a practice cannot and should not be pre-decided by the painter’s 
intention, as if it did, the potential of what practice incites could be restricted. 
Finding the moment of completion of a painting should be an encounter 
(O’Sullivan, 2006: 1) which marks that the painter has found something new and 
expanded her/his original intentions or ideas. In this way, even the painter does 
not totally ‘own’ the finished work as it contains elements outside the painter. A 
finished painting is a totality of its own and viewing it becomes an actualisation in 
which viewers have to connect their own memories to the painting. As discussed 
in Section 1.2, this project explores what nostalgic experiences can become 
rather than what a nostalgic experience is, hence painting practice being 





Due to its tight connection with time and memory, photography is used as a major 
material of painting in this project. As will be further discussed in Chapter Three, 
the two main roles of photographs in this project are the triggers of nostalgic 
experiences and the visual representations of the objects in the nostalgic reveries. 
In discussing the relationships between photography, painting and reality, 
Gerhard Richter says, ‘Photographs were regarded as true, painting as artificial. 
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The painted picture was no longer credible; its representation froze into immobility, 
because it was not authentic but invented.’ (Elger and Ulrich Obrist, 2009: 30) 
Similarly, in the Ontology of the Photographic Image, André Bazin states that, in 
painting there is ‘a human hand intervened cast a shadow of doubt over the 
image’, and the main difference between photography and painting is this 
‘inescapable subjectivity’ of painting (Bazin, 1960: 7). These observations define 
the character that differentiates painting and photography as painting’s 
subjectivity or its artificial nature. Indeed, as discussed in the section 1.6, since 
the process of actualisation, or ‘clearing-out’ (Deleuze, Deleuze, 2017:61) is 
throughout the entire process of painting, its inseparable relationship with the 
painter’s subjectivity is undeniable. By contrast, while also being an artificial static 
two-dimensional image, photography is fundamentally inseparable with 
something outside the photographer (i.e. the photograph’s subjects), as Roland 
Barthes says in Camera Lucida: 
 
The Photograph always carries its referent with itself, both affected by the 
same amorous or funereal immobility, at the very heart of the moving 
world…The Photograph belongs to that class of laminated objects whose 
two leaves cannot be separated without destroying them both. (Barthes, 
1999: 5-6) 
 
Even so, we cannot neglect the fact that photography is a human activity. To a 
certain extent, a photograph and its photographer also cannot be separated, as 
the photograph exists because of the photographer’s intention and it only shows 
what its photographer chooses to show. Barthes also defines a photograph as 
the immobility at the heart of the moving world and this implies a fundamental 
difference between the world which is a totality in nonstop becoming and a 
photograph which is a static image that always shows certain fragments of the 
world at a certain state.    
 
As discussed in Sections 1.2 and 1.3, the philosophies of Bergson, O’Sullivan, 
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Deleuze and Guattari imply that nothing is static and isolated, while being 
durations on their own, all entities are also ‘nodal points’ (O’Sullivan, 2006: 12) 
which form a rhizome (i.e. a chaotic, centerless connectivity in constant shifting 
and expanding) through connecting to each other. Therefore, an entity itself is in 
a process of non-stop becoming and no particular state during it can be defined 
as its true identity or nature. In discussing the connections between entities, 
Deleuze and Guattari use the concept of rhizome to indicate that all entities are 
inevitably in connections with others. These connections are not made according 
to some set structures and are constantly in unpredictable shifting. Accordingly, 
the identity of an entity becomes ambiguous within a rhizome, as while being an 
individual on its own, at the same time it is always also a rhizome connected by 
other entities, and a part which forms a larger rhizome. As a result, the distinction 
between entities becomes temporary and questionable, as from a different 
perspective, two individuals might become parts that form another entity. In this 
sense, as both the photographer and her/his subjects are nodal points within such 
a shifting rhizome, when they make a connection and produce a photograph, can 
a clear distinction between objectivity and subjectivity be found within the piece? 
and can a photograph really be regarded as the true or real?  
 
In order to answer these questions, we need to understand how a photographer 
works. American photographer Saul Leiter’s undramatic statement might 
conclude a major way of taking photographs, as he says, ‘I go out to take a walk, 
I see something, I take a picture. I take photographs.’ (Carroll, 2018: 32) This 
statement implies how personal and occasional it is to take a photograph. The 
photographer finds a moment in which several entities (including the 
photographer) intersect and form an image which is so significant for the 
photographer that she/he feels compelled to capture and document. For the 
photographer, these kinds of opportunities might seem precious, as within a 
moving world, they could only exist in seconds. However, this sense of 
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preciousness cannot be sensed by everybody. Due to the differences in their 
memories, even a person standing right next to the photographer at the moment 
could be attracted to other elements in the same environment. Therefore, taking 
a photograph does not seem less subjective than making a painting, as what is 
at the core of a photograph’s production is also the maker’s perception, selection, 
and adjustment of the environment that she/he is in. From this perspective, 
photography has at least two features, personal and occasional. 
 
Sean Watson uses the term actualisation to describe the process of a person 
turns a totality, or virtual, into her/his consciousness through selection and 
adjustment (Watson, 1998). In this sense, taking a photograph can be seen as 
an act of visually documenting the photographer’s actualisation, because for the 
photographer, finding the subjects that she/he wants to photograph is the result 
of how she/he actualises the virtual (i.e. the environment she/he is in). As 
discussed in Section 1.2, Bergson indicates in Matter and Memory that, in order 
to actualise a virtual experience, apart from making selection from it, the person 
also adjusts the selected elements (Bergson, 1991: 133-134). Photographers and 
scholars have been discussing how photography is inseparable with selection, 
for example, Barthes points out that a photograph ‘suggests the gesture of the 
child pointing his finger at something and saying: that, there it is, lo!’ (Barthes, 
1999: 5) However, by associating photography with reality and objectivity, Richter 
and Bazin’s arguments (Elger and Ulrich Obrist, 2009: 30; Bazin, 1960: 7) 
indicate that photography is commonly understood as a means that does not 
intervene or adjust its subjects. Accordingly, defining photography as an art of 
actualisation means that the question of how does a photographer adjust her/his 
subjects by photographing them needs to be answered. 
 
Indeed, there are obvious ways that a photographer adjusts her/his works. For 
instance, with the help of special functions of the camera or some software on a 
37 
 
computer, the photographer can turn the original captured image into a scene 
that she/he has never personally experienced by, for example, adding elements 
that were not in the original moment or adjusting the look of elements in the scene. 
Digital possibilities do expand photography, but considering that photography had 
been performing its influences without the digital for over a century and I would 
argue would not be severely affected without it, this kind of digital adjustment 
should be seen as an external tool rather than an ontological function or feature 
of photography. Besides using digital means, in some cases, the photographer 
may make physical adjustments directly to the subjects before taking the 
photograph (e.g. a photographer prunes a potted plant before photographing it). 
In this way, the subjects’ becoming would indeed be physically adjusted, but as 
these adjustments are made directly by the photographer’s hands rather than the 
act of photographing, they cannot be regarded as the results of being 
photographed. 
 
The problem is that, both means of external adjustment, digital and physical, 
happen outside the act of taking a photograph. It is worth noting at this point that 
taking a photograph does not equal the production of a photograph. In fact, while 
the act of taking a photograph (i.e. visually capturing the subject’s state with a 
camera) only requires an instant, producing a photograph is a process (i.e. from 
the moment that the photographer finds the subjects that interest her/him to the 
moment that the photograph physically comes into being) which consumes a 
period of time. As discussed, both the photographer and her/his subjects are 
nonstop becoming. Therefore, by pointing the camera at something and pressing 
the shutter, what the photographer does is to take a cross section of the subjects’ 
becoming. When the actual photograph comes into being, all relevant entities (the 
photographer and the subjects) would be in different states. Therefore, a 
photograph is unbreakably linked with multiple perspectives of differences 
including the differences in the states within the photographer and the subjects’ 
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own becoming or duration, and the differences between how these entities 
connect and relate to each other in different moments. It is in this sense that the 
Japanese photographer Ryuji Miyamoto says, ‘Photographs are only able to 
speak in the past tense.’ (Carroll, 2018: 100)  
 
Therefore, the photograph should not be seen as an image that record facts. As 
Graham Clarke argues in the Photograph, believing the photograph cannot lie is 
a deep but misplaced notion, because, 
 
In many contexts the notion of a literal and objective record of ‘history’ is a 
limited illusion. It ignores the entire cultural and social background against 
which the image was taken, just as it renders the photographer a neutral, 
passive, and invisible recorder of the scene. (Clarke, 1997: 145-146) 
 
Besides ignoring the subjects’ cultural and social background, even the 
subjects’ factual connections with what is outside the frame would be cut off 
by being photographed. As a result, the elements that go in the frame start to 
form new connections and this could make the viewers’ interpretations 
subjective compositions rather than passive and objective receiving of facts, 
such as in a photograph taken by Saul Leiter in 1950 (Fig.1). The image 
captures several reflections on a window including a child looking at something 
outside the frame, a person climbing stairs, the facade of a building and some 
branches and leaves of a tree. Instead of forming a narrative, these elements 
are being directly merged together. As a result, the entities that did not have 
direct links between each other at the moment of photographing started to 
form a rhizome by making new connections to each other within the frame. For 
example, since they were facing opposite directions, the person climbing the 
stairs and the child might not have noticed each other at that moment. As 
viewers cannot know what the child was looking at and where (e.g. home, 
office) the person was going to, there was a room for viewers to imagine. 
Within the blurred and chaotic environment, the juxtaposition between the two 
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people starts to generate a dramatic sense as if something was going on 
between them. Viewing this photograph could become a task of composing a 
narrative between these two people. As the American photographer Jason 
Fulford says, ‘When a person looks at a photograph you’ve taken, they will 
always think of themselves.’ (Carroll, 2018: 56) In order to fulfil this task of 
composing the narrative, viewers from different times and places have to turn 
to their own memories. In other words, the photograph becomes the virtual for 
viewers to perceive, and the narrative composed becomes the viewer’s actual. 
Therefore, whenever this photograph is viewed, a new actualisation is made. 
By being photographed, the child’s original connection with what was outside 
the frame and the person at the stair’s connection with her/his destination were 
cut off. However, at the same time, although themselves could not have known, 
new connections between themselves and with countless people and 
memories could be made when the photograph physically came into being. 
Therefore, from the perspective of connectivity, what photography adjusts are 








To the subject of photography, being photographed means that there is an 
adjustment between two perspectives. From the perspective of becoming, the 
subject is given an immobile alternative face which shapes its interpretation 
despite its actual state in the unstoppable becoming. From the perspective of 
connectivity, by being photographed, the subjects’ connections with others at that 
moment are being, in Deleuze and Guattari’s words, de-and-reterritorialised. 
Original connections are cut off by the photographer’s frame and new 
connections will be made every time the photograph is seen. 
 
For both the photographer and viewers, photography is an art of actualisation 
with a person’s subjectivity at its core. The objectivity or ‘real’ that an unedited 
photograph documents is the transitory encounter between the photographer and 
the subjects rather than the subjects in themselves. However, as the world is in 
nonstop becoming, when the documented transitory encounter physically comes 
into being as a static image, its subjects and the relationships between them 
would have been in different states to when the static image is viewed. If we 
define reality as the material world we are at in the present, then a photograph is 
like the ghost of a piece of bygone reality who wanders into the present. 
Whenever it is looked at, the photograph is being interpreted by a different 
memory (even by the same person) within a different environment (i.e. 
connectivity). Questions such as what are the subjects in the photograph and 
what are the relationships between them will be answered by a particular 
subjectivity within a particular connectivity. Therefore, instead of objectively 
restoring that piece of bygone reality, a photograph makes a connection between 
two moments of actualisations (i.e. the one in which the photographer takes the 
photograph, and the one in which the viewer interprets the photograph). By being 
the actual of the photographer and the virtual for viewers at the same time, 
photographs promote the connections between different memories, states, and 
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Based on the research of Constantine Sedikides, Tim Wildschut and Denise 
Baden (2004), as well as Henri Bergson’s philosophy of actualisation (1991) and 
duration (2001), nostalgia in this project is conceptualised as a process of dealing 
with an illusion of the past. This illusion of the past is defined as the nostalgic 
reverie. It is an imagined image of the past that actualised from the person’s 
present that includes her/his memory, affect present circumstances. Because it 
is centreless and formed by the connections between heterogeneous elements, 
it can be defined as a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). Accordingly, 
nostalgic experience, which is the process of dealing with a nostalgic reverie, is 
also rhizomatic. There is no predetermined structure or model that organises all 
nostalgic experiences. According to the researches of psychologists such as 
Roderick Peters (1985), Constantine Sedikides (2006), Tim Wildschut (2004) and 
Zhao Jingrong (2005), nostalgic experience is non-repeatable and has 
unpredictable effects.  
 
Based on the theories of James Elkins (2000), Barbara Bolt (2004) and the 
philosophy of rhizome and de-and-reterritorialisation by Deleuze and Guattari 
(1987), painting can be defined as a rhizomatic process which progresses under 
the mutual influences between elements such as the painter’s thoughts, emotions 
and the act of handling paint. Therefore, painting a nostalgic experience means 
that the non-repeatable and unpredictable nostalgic experience is handled by the 
logic of practice therefore it cannot be totally decided and controlled by the painter 
(Bolt, 2004: 4-5). While the memories and emotions of the nostalgic experience 
influence the painter’s practice, handling paint in turn shifts the painter’s nostalgic 
experience at the same time. Moreover, as photographs function as the triggers 
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of most of the nostalgic experiences within this study and the visual 
representations of some objects within the nostalgic reveries, they become 
another heterogeneous element that joins the rhizomatic practice of painting.  
 
As discussed in Section 1.6, a photograph does not document or represent the 
truth or reality. Rather, it records the transitory encounter between the 
photographer and the subjects rather than the subjects in themselves. As a 
person’s memory can be seen as a duration which constantly reaches new states, 
every experience of viewing a photograph should be seen as a new experience 
in terms of triggering one’s memory. Therefore, photographs become a channel 
through which thoughts, memories and affect outside the nostalgic experience 
can be linked to the rhizome of painting a nostalgic experience. Accordingly, 
through creating connections between elements such as memories, affect, 
imaginations and visual documentations of some object’s previous state, painting 
a nostalgic experience has the potential to create new ideas on the relationships 




















As discussed in Chapter One: Section 1.2, a nostalgic experience is a process of 
dealing with an image of the past that the person longs for. This image is defined 
as the nostalgic reverie and it is a non-repeatable assemblage of several 
simultaneous actualisations which at least include the person’s selected memory, 
the actualised world of the moment and her/his affect. Memory is particularly 
significant in the formation of a nostalgic reverie, as while it influences how the 
person perceives the world (Watson, 1998), it is also the virtual (i.e. the totality) 
from which the nostalgic reverie is actualised through selection and adjustment. 
More importantly, as memory can be defined as a duration which is a succession 
without distinction, an interpenetration of elements so heterogeneous that former 
states can never recur’ (Bergson, 2001: vii), a nostalgic experience is an 
inseparable extension of the person’s memory rather than an isolated new entity 
generated from it.  
 
When recalling a nostalgic experience from another time, the person is making a 
new assemblage by selecting, adjusting, and reconnecting her/his memory. 
Theoretical physicist Lee Smolin points out that human beings perceive time as 
change (Smolin, 2014: 38). In this sense, a recalled memory of a nostalgic 
experience is fundamentally different from the original one. As the person’s 
memory as an entity would be in a different state when she/he recalls, the recalled 
memory of a former nostalgic experience would be a new interpretation rather 
than re-presentation. Psychological researches have pointed out that, nostalgia 
is fundamentally an affect (Constantine Sedikides et al., 2004: 205), and it could 
cause both positive and negative effect to the person (Kaplan, 1987: 465; Best 
and Nelson, 1985: 221-233). This means, the effect of an ongoing nostalgic 
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experience is unpredictable whereas the recalled memory of a nostalgic 
experience is the re-interpretation of a former state. 
 
Therefore, painting an ongoing nostalgic experience means to visually and 
materially handle the simultaneously happened articulations with paint, and 
painting a bygone nostalgic experience is to handle the process of re-
interpretation with paint. As will be further discussed below, instead of being a 
pre-determined schema for painting to actualise, the theoretical researches 
discussed in Chapter One function as, in Barbara Bolt’s words, a ‘prior context of 
intelligibility’ (Bolt, 2010: 97) which handling paint can dependent upon. Key 
elements in nostalgic experiences such as the person’s actualised memory and 
affect, her/his nostalgic experience, and the actualised outside world are not 
organised according to a predetermined structure. In Simon O’Sullivan’s words, 
they are ‘nodal points that connected to one another in a non-hierarchical manner’ 
(O’Sullivan, 2006: 12). By making new connections between them, new 
meanings and ideas can be created. However, these new ideas and 
understandings cannot be preconceived, as Bolt says:  
 
By definition the new cannot be preconceived, and in the face of the 
seemingly limitless possibilities practice cannot know or preconceive its 
outcome. According to Heidegger, then, the new emerges through process 
as a shudder that presents itself to us. (Bolt, 2010: 95) 
 
The task of creating new insight and knowledge through making different 
connection between these points and is led by handling paint. This requires the 
practice to go beyond representationalism (Bolt, 2004) in which theories would 
be used as a model that determines practice. As will be further discussed in 
Section 2.3, the aim of painting beyond representationalism could be achieved 
by praxis which means a two-way action or mutual reflection between practice 




2.2 The Work and Knowledge 
 
In Research in Art and Design, by asking the question, ‘How can I tell what I am 
till I see what I make and do?’, educationist Christopher Frayling indicates the 
fascinating dilemma in ‘autobiography and personal development being 
communicable knowledge’ (Frayling, 1993: 5) in artistic research. This dilemma 
is prominent in this project, as discussed in the introduction of this chapter, two 
main research subjects, memory and nostalgia, are closely linked to actualisation 
which is a process through which a person’s consciousness and affect develops. 
Therefore, personal development is a key subject of this project. In order to turn 
it into communicable knowledge with painting, the role of the work needs to be 
interrogated, as viewing it is the channel of communicating knowledge.  
 
Frayling defines the work, or artefact as ‘the end product of the research where 
the thinking is embodied in’ (Frayling, 1993: 5). It is worth noting that, in this 
project, ‘the end’ should only refer to the physical and material process of making 
the work. If this ‘ending’ of practice also means that the artist’s thinking has turned 
into a set conclusion for viewer to understand, then accordingly, the ‘right’, or 
effective way of viewing of the work is predetermined. As the result, the work 
becomes representational to the viewer, as there is always a predetermined 
conclusion (i.e. the knowledge) which functions as the ‘right’ understanding that 
classified viewing experiences into the binary of right and wrong. Artistic research 
in this way would be bonded with singular truth and the room for new thoughts 
and imagination would be limited. Therefore, as Henk Borgdorff puts it, instead of 
making explicit the knowledge that it is said to produce, the work should ‘invite 
unfinished thinking’ (Borgdoff, 2012: 162). 
 
Similarly, in The Aesthetics of Affect: Thinking Art Beyond Representation, Simon 
O’Sullivan makes the statement that ‘art is not an object of knowledge’ (or not 
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only an object of knowledge), and what it produces is affect rather than 
knowledge. He says: 
 
Affect can be described as extra-discursive and extra-textual…affects are 
not to do with knowledge or meaning; indeed, they occur on a different, 
signifying register. In fact, this is what differentiates art from language…art 
is a bundle of affects or, as Deleuze and Guattari would say, a bloc of 
sensations, waiting to be reactivated by a spectator or participant. Indeed, 
you cannot read affects, you can only experience them (O’Sullivan, 2001: 
26). 
 
The question of whether affect can be a knowledge? and can it be communicable? 
then emerged. Knowledge is a wide concept, as O’Sullivan associates the word 
with language and reading, knowledge in his discussion might actually mean 
propositional knowledge which, as Borgdorff defines, is ‘the knowledge of facts, 
knowledge about the world, knowing that such and such is the case’ (Borgdoff, 
2012: 162). Therefore, by viewing an artwork, viewers cannot gain the knowledge 
which can be explicitly testified like a mathematical formula. Viewing a work is to 
perceive and experience. What a viewer experiences from viewing a work is also 
a process of actualisation in which the work is the virtual or totality, and the 
viewer’s memory influences her/his focus and interpretation of the work. The work 
becomes a starting point from which viewers can encounter new affective 
experiences and consciousness (i.e. the actual). In this way, due to the 
differences between individual’s memories, what a viewer can get from viewing 
the work is unpredictable. The assertion that ‘art cannot be an object of 
propositional knowledge’ also becomes questionable because the example in 
Frayling’s discussion of George Stubbs’ researches on animal anatomy which 
involves portfolios of drawings of dissections being used by scientists (Frayling, 
1993: 3) has indicated that art can communicate with science. O’Sullivan, 
although does not directly mention actualisation, also associates art with virtual, 




In the realm of the virtual, art - art work - is no longer an object as such, or 
not only an object, but rather a space, a zone or what Alain Badiou might 
call an ‘event site’: ‘a point of exile where it is possible that something, finally, 
might happen (84, n. 5). (O’Sullivan, 2001: 27) 
 
Therefore, the artistic practice in this project is aiming to territorialise such a zone, 
or space, or the virtual. With painting as the means, the painter’s memory or 
nostalgic reverie as the initial totality would be turned into an image. Deleuze 
indicates, in perceiving an object, only those elements that interest the viewer 
could go into her/his consciousness (Deleuze, 1991:24-25). When this image 
actualised from the painter’s nostalgic reverie is being viewed, it does not enter 
the viewer’s mind as an entity. As selection and adjustment might happen during 
the perceiving process, this image could be seen as a virtual for viewers to 
actualise.  
 
As discussed above, painting a nostalgic experience means to materially and 
visually manipulate a non-repeatable assemblage of several actualisations that 
simultaneously happened. From a Deleuzoguattarian perspective, such a 
process can be understood as the forming of a rhizome in which the actualised 
elements as the nodal points that connect to one another in a non-hierarchical 
manner. This painting/rhizome does not tell viewers what the painter finds or 
concludes from the process of weaving it, rather, viewing the painting/rhizome is 
an act that triggers developments for both sides. For the viewer, perceiving the 
work is a process of actualisation through which she/he gains new affective 
experiences and consciousness; and for the painting/rhizome, being viewed by a 
viewer is an expansion, as the viewer’s selection makes new connections 
between her/his memory and some nodal points within it.  
 
Therefore, this project could produce a new role, or function of painting. With a 
nostalgic experience as the subject, painting practice can be the means through 
which the painter breaks several pairs of binaries (e.g. the one between the past 
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and present, and the one between the subject and the ‘outside’ world). It 
organises these elements into a rhizome which, instead of representing some set 
conclusion, produces new affective experiences, consciousness, and ideas to 
viewers. Viewing the work becomes a way of expanding the rhizome, and as 
Simon O’Sullivan says, the rhizome is ‘a paradigmatic example of the invention 
of a concept’ (O’Sullivan, 2006: 12). The expansion of a rhizome could enrich the 
potential of creating new concepts within the painting. 
 
2.3 Beyond Representation 
 
As painting aims to create a rhizome in this project, the practice should have more 
than one logic that directs its progression, for Damian Sutton and David Martin-
Jones point out that there is no singular cause in a rhizome (Sutton and Martin-
Jones, 2008: 4). Barbara Bolt implies that singular cause is at the core of 
representation (Bolt, 2004: 18), as in a representational practice the subject is 
reduced into a fixed prototype, model or schema that decides how the practice 
should progress and what the work should be like. In other words, in 
representation, practice must be the result of the prototype or model (i.e. the 
singular cause). Representation hence restricts practice to a role of following and 
depriving its possibility of creating something new. According to the distinction 
between an object of recognition (with which our knowledges, beliefs and values 
are reconfirmed) and an object of encounter to the painter herself/himself (which 
ruptures and expands our typical ways of being in the world) made by Simon 
O’Sullivan (2006: 1), representational practice is a practice of recognition, as 
practice in this case always aims to actualise a model which is formed from the 
painter’s existing knowledges, beliefs and values.  
 
Therefore, understanding representational practice in painting as to copy 
something that exists out there does not reach the nub of representationalism. As 
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long as a painter practices to actualise a pre-determined prototype, model, or 
schema generated from her/his existing territory, she/he is practicing 
representationally. In order to practice beyond representationalism, it is vital not 
to pre-decide nostalgia as a blueprint or model. This means that the relationship 
between psychological research (as discussed in Chapter One) and artistic 
practice needs to be interrogated. In other words, the binary between practice 
and theory also needs to be guarded against. Gerhard Richter implies that this 
binary in painting might be artificial and not necessary, as he says, ‘Painting has 
nothing to do with thinking, because in painting thinking is painting.’ (Elger and 
Ulrich Obrist, 2009: 14). 
 
As discussed above, painting a nostalgic experience means to visually and 
materially manipulate, or handle the simultaneously happened actualisations with 
paint. The understanding of nostalgic experience is based on some philosophical 
and psychological theories. However, as nostalgic experiences are non-
repeatable (Zhao, 2005) with unpredictable effects (Kaplan, 1987: 465; Best and 
Nelson, 1985: 221-233), the theories cannot be seen as the model that organises 
all nostalgic experiences. Rather, theories offer a perspective of looking at the 
particular nostalgic experience that the painter is handling. They influence rather 
than determine painting. As handling paint has its own momentum, rhythm and 
intensity that could shift the painter’s thoughts and affect (Bolt, 2004: 1), the 
painter’s perspective of looking at the nostalgic experience might in turn be 
changed through painting.  
 
This two-way action or mutual reflection between practice and theory defines the 
term praxis (Bolt, 2004: 65). The binary between theory and practice is abolished 
as the outcome of praxis is produced through their mutual influences. In this way, 
the relevant materials and elements in this project no longer have strict roles that 
they must play. Invisible elements such as memory and affect become materials 
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for handling, and physical materials such as paints and photographs become 
subjects to learn about. Insight and knowledge of materials in this sense is indeed 
fundamentally unpredictable as the connections between subjects and materials 
could be made from several different perspectives (e.g. insight about memory 
and nostalgia emerged from handling paints, insight about paints emerged from 
handing memory and nostalgia through paints).  
 
In Martin Heidegger’s words, the moment of finding the knowledge and insight of 
the material through dealing with it is when the material ‘manifests itself in its own 
right’ (Heidegger, 1962: 98). He defines this kind of knowledge, or in his words, 
the kind of being which equipment possesses, ‘readiness-to-hand’ (Heidegger, 
1962: 98), and points out that, 
 
Only because equipment has this 'Being-in-itself' and does not merely 
occur, is it manipulable in the broadest sense and at our disposal. No matter 
how sharply we just look at the 'outward appearance of Things in whatever 
form this takes, we cannot discover anything ready-to-hand. If we look at 
Things just 'theoretically', we can get along without understanding 
readiness-to-hand. But when we deal with them by using them and 
manipulating them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, 
by which our manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific 
Thingly character. Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the 
manifold assignments of the 'in-order-to'. And the sight with which they thus 
accommodate themselves is circumspection. (Heidegger, 1962: 98) 
 
This can be seen as a practical perception, or actualisation which particularly 
concerns with the material and practical aspects of the handler’s memory (i.e. 
her/his habitual ways of practice). For the handler, how a material should be 
handled is largely decided by her/his habitual ways of practice. As a result, in 
Simon O’Sullivan’s words, the handling could be a ‘practice of recognition’ (2006: 
1) in which the handler repeats her/his habitual ways of practice; or a ‘practice of 
encounter’ (2006: 1) in which the handler’s habitual ways of practice are ruptured 




A series of my paintings can be the example of how a painter finds encounter 
during her/his habitual way of practice. In 2013, while making a landscape 
painting using ink and rice paper on top of a piece of wood panel, I accidently 
discovered that through the rice paper, which is very thin and almost semi-
transparent, the ink soaked in the wood panel beneath and created another layer 
of image making (Fig.2). Moreover, during this process, the rice paper functioned 
as a kind of filter that transformed the painted landscape into an abstract image 
that manifested a power of its own. Accordingly, the roles of the materials 
unexpectedly changed, the wood panel which initially supported the practice 
became a kind of ‘canvas’ which received the ink; whereas the rice paper, which 





Fig.2, Untitled, Rongwei Zhang, 2013, ink on wood panel, 90 x 90cm. 
 
This is an example of encountering some familiar materials’ new possibilities of 
being handled. In Heidegger’s words, I found new readiness-to-hand (Heidegger, 
1962: 98) of rice paper through these paintings. From the perspective of Deleuze 
and Guattari, finding this ‘readiness-to-hand’ through handling materials is also 
the creation of a ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9) through which the 
original plan of making a landscape painting was shifted into a practice of making 
an abstract painting through de-and-reterritorialising the materials’ functions. It 
also illustrates that non-representational practice (i.e. without a predetermined 
theoretical conclusion as the subject to shape and direct the practice) does not 
mean the practice has no aim and structure. In Simon O’Sullivan’s words, finding 
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new insight, or ‘readiness-to-hand’ of the materials through handling is an 
encounter experience that ruptures and expands my habitual territory of practice, 
and from a Deleuzoguattarian perspective, ‘line of flight’ that enables de-and-
reterritorialisation to happen (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9) can be created 
through such a practice.  
 
This special kind of sight, or looking at something through practice, is what 
Heidegger calls ‘circumspection’ (Heidegger, 1962: 98-99). He argues that 
circumspective interpretation is grounded in a prior context of intelligibility which 
he calls a fore-structure that includes fore-having which is ‘something we have in 
advance’; fore-sight which is ‘something we see in advance’; and fore-conception 
which is ‘something we grasp in advance’ (Heidegger, 1962: 191). Heidegger 
further indicates that, 
 
Whenever something is interpreted as something, the interpretation will be 
founded essentially upon fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. An 
interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something 
presented to us (Heidegger, 1962: 191-192). 
 
As discussed above, elements such as memory, nostalgic experience, and affect 
are also materials which can be handled in this project. Therefore, what the 
theoretical analysis of nostalgia, memory, and affect do in chapter one is to form 
the prior context of intelligibility which painting can dependent upon. Instead of 
determining the painting practice, in Barbara Bolt’s words, this context ‘enables 
us to interpret and respond to the possibilities that things threw up.’ (Bolt, 2010: 
98) 
 
2.4 Rhizomatic Practice 
 
A single painting practice has several perspectives of power or logic that function 
as its ‘driving forces’. For example, a painting in this project might be directed by 
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the cognitive aim of depicting a memory and the logic of manipulating paint at the 
same time. The aim of transcending representation is achieved through this 
multiplicity (which is a key feature of rhizome) in the ‘driving force’ of the practice. 
Accordingly, instead of being a direct line from the subject to the finished work, 
the progression of practice is a horizontal expansion which does not follow any 
transcendental logic or structure. Practice in this sense is rhizomatic, as Simon 
O’Sullivan’s discusses:  
 
a system, or anti-system, without center or indeed any central organising 
motif. It is flat system in which the individual nodal points can, and are, 
connected to one another in a non-hierarchical manner. (O’Sullivan, 2006: 
12) 
 
The ‘individual nodal points’ are elements such as memory, nostalgia, paints and 
photograph, and their connections are made through practice i.e. being handled. 
However, as Damien Sutton and David Martin-Jones suggest, whenever we 
explore thought (or, indeed, anything else) rhizomatically, there is always a deep 
ambiguity involved (Sutton and Martin-Jones 2008:6). Seeing something 
rhizomatically causes ambiguity in defining its identities and this further 
influences its connections with others. For example, the identities of key elements 
in this project such as memory, nostalgia, paints and photograph are shifting 
between the subject and the materials. This means that, every element exists as 
more than one ‘nodal point’ at the same time. As a result, when being seen as 
identity A and connected to other things, the element’s identity B might 
accordingly be made into some other unexpected connection. These connections 
between identities, which are also formed by the connections between other 
nodal points, form new identities, or nodal points which extend these multiple-
layered connections. Identities formed from this chaotic mass only exist 
temporarily; their formation might unexpectedly participate other identities’ 
formations; and there is no clear division between things. Deleuze and Guattari 




There is no unity to serve as a pivot in the object, or to divide in the subject. 
There is not even the unity to abort in the object or "return" in the subject. 
A multiplicity has neither subject nor object, only determinations, 
magnitudes, and dimensions. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 8) 
 
However, with the theory of double articulation between the molar and the 
molecular (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 213-216), Deleuze and Guattari indicate 
that the rhizome’s compound movement of connecting and becoming does not 
completely repel tree-structure thinking (causal, hierarchical, and structured by 
binaries). Molar and molecular are two different kinds of movements, as Bolt 
illustrates, the ‘molar’ can be exemplified by the great binary aggregates such as 
sex or class or representation. It is an arborescent structure that has a rigid linear 
segmentarity (Bolt, 2004:45). Hence, in describing a movement, a molar is the 
process of becoming a tree-like structure. Molecular movement, although 
escapes the binary organisation and is not ordered and classified in any formal 
way, cannot be defined as the total opposition of molar organisations, as the two 
processes coexist and cross over into each other. Molecular escapes always 
happen during the formation of a molar organisation, yet molecular escapes 
‘would be nothing if they did not return to molar organisations.’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987:216-217) Deleuze and Guattari use the terms ‘class’ and ‘mass’ to 
analyse the two movements (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:213-214). As they point 
out, class is a tree-structured molar segmentarity; and by contrast, mass is a 
molecular motion with no fixed order. Classes are fashioned from masses through 
crystallisation or sedimentation, yet masses constantly flow from classes in this 
sedimentation. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:216)  
 
Therefore, representational practice might mean that the practice is caused and 
decided by a predetermined molar structure and hence lost the possibilities of 
making molecular escape. By contrast, rhizomatic practice, although fostering 
molecular movement, still results in molar structures. Compared to 
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representational practice, molar structures created by rhizomatic practice are not 
predetermined and unpredictable. As Simon O’Sullivan puts it, finding them is an 
encounter can be seen as a kind of new knowledge, although it is important to 
see the work as a rhizomatic multiplicity rather than a predetermined identity. 
Molar organisations, or tree-structured formations, could still play important parts, 
or even be the found new knowledge during the practical process as their ‘fixity’ 




This research project utilises painting practice to visually and materially handle 
the becoming and actualisation of memory and nostalgic experiences. The 
practice turns a chaotic totality (i.e. memory and nostalgic experiences) into a 
static two-dimensional image. In order to transcend representation, practice is not 
given a predetermined schema to actualise. The aim of studying the literature on 
key concepts such as memory, nostalgia, painting, and photography is to create 
a prior context of intelligibility which practice can be dependent upon.  
 
Without the dominance of a predetermined schema, practice is pushed forward 
by multiple perspectives of power or logic which include the cognitive aim of 
depicting a memory and the practical logic of manipulating materials. Therefore, 
in a sense, the start of a practice is the start of a molecular movement which, 
although is not ordered and classified in any formal way, still aims to form 
unexpected molar organisations which can be the ‘nodal points’ within a rhizome 
that forms new concepts through connectivity. 
 
As the materials being handled in this project include memory, nostalgic 
experiences, paints, and photography, the formed molar organisations might be 
new insight, or ‘ready-to-hand’ of these elements. Accordingly, the finished 
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painting becomes the connectivity, or rhizome of these material insights. It can 
also be seen as a virtual, or a totality on its own, and for the viewer, viewing the 
work becomes a perception through which she/he gains new affective 
experiences and consciousness. In this way, making and viewing the painting are 
both processes of actualisation which include selection and adjustment, and 
through these actualisations, the viewers’ memories and the artist’s can form 

























Chapter Three: Practice Analysis 
 
Chapter Three discusses three projects that I made in order to explore the 
research question. However, as most of the nostalgic reveries used in these 
projects were triggered by photographs, a discussion on how different 
photographs trigger the viewer’s memory in various ways is made before the 
discussion on each project. 
 
3.1 Different Photographs and Different Triggered Memories 
 
A nostalgic experience should not be confused with a nostalgic reverie. Nostalgic 
reverie means the image of the past that the person longs for. By contrast, a 
nostalgic experience means the entire process of a person dealing with a 
nostalgic reverie and the affective movements triggered by it. In other words, 
nostalgic reverie is the image that sits within a nostalgic experience. As discussed 
in Chapter One, Section 1.2, nostalgic reverie is a non-repeatably created 
beautified and imagined scene of the past rather than the reappearance of some 
bygone facts (Zhao, 2005), having a nostalgic experience means that the person 
is longing for an imagined scene.   
 
In this project, nostalgic experiences are triggered by viewing photographs. 
Looking is a form of perceiving. Both Bergson and Deleuze argue that, when a 
person perceives an object, only the elements that interest the person could enter 
her/his consciousness (Bergson, 1991: 36; Deleuze, 1991: 24-25). According to 
Bergson, the person’s memory plays a vital role when she/he perceives an object 
as immediate conscious awareness of the present is always a contracted mixture 
of sensation and memory (Bergson, 2007: 175-176). As discussed in Chapter 
One: Section 1.2, a person’s memory is an undividable entity that constantly 
achieves new states (Bergson, 2001). Therefore, although a photograph is a 
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static image, every experience of looking at or perceiving it would be new and 
non-repeatable as the viewer’s memory would be different in every perceiving.  
 
By looking at a photograph, the person is using her/his present memory to 
interpret the past and this means that the interpretation must be a new 
construction rather than an explanation of what the scene is. Questions such as 
identifying the objects in the photograph and defining a meaning or theme for the 
photograph require some nodal points (i.e. the objects and plots) from the 
rhizome of memory to stand out and make certain connections between 
themselves and some aspects of the photograph. As Brian Massumi points out, 
similar to memory, affect is the totality of emotional movements within the body, 
then emotion occurs when selection happens and certain affective movements 
are assimilated into the person’s consciousness (Massumi, 1996: 226). Therefore, 
apart from the cognitive aspects, looking at a photograph also triggers affective 
movements and the emergence of emotions.  
 
Even perceiving a photograph taken by the viewer herself/himself could not be 
seen as an act of bringing the past back in the viewer’s mind. In discussing the 
relationships between photographs and memory, clinical researcher Tim Fawns 
argues that, over time, photographs ‘gain performativity that allows them to divert 
from the purposes, spaces and times for which they are created’ (2014: 3). 
Therefore, even photographs ‘act as cues that help us to mentally reconstruct 
related episodes’ (Fawns, 2014: 7), the memories that are reconstructed by 
viewing a photograph should be seen as a new creation rather than the re-
presentation of the moment of photographing.  
 
The act of viewing a photograph in general triggers new thoughts and 
imaginations rather than the re-presentation of the past. But different types of 
photographs might trigger the viewer’s imagination in different ways. For example, 
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while analysing how we read a photograph, Graham Clarke argues that ‘We must 
remember that the photograph is itself the product of a photographer. It is always 
the reflection of a specific point of view, be it aesthetic, political, or ideological’ 
(1997: 29). Hence, viewing a photograph taken by the viewer herself/himself 
might be a different experience from viewing a found photograph. In the first case, 
as the ‘specific point of view’ that generated the photograph was a former state 
of the viewer, what is triggered might be a re-interpretation or re-creation of the 
state. By contrast, viewing a photograph of the latter case is a new perceiving 
experience.   
 
This project particularly examines the three types of photographs. The first case 
is the photograph taken by me of a subject that I had encountered previously. The 
second case is the photograph taken by me of a subject that I encountered for 
the first time. The third case is the photograph taken by other people. 
 
 




In the first case, the photograph was taken by me of a place that I had 
encountered before. In other words, certain aspects or former states of the place 
were already in my memory as a part of a narrative, meaning, or emotion. 
Photographing the place could be an act of documenting a moment in which a 
particular part of my memory is triggered and activated. However, as my memory 
as a bloc at the time of photographing the place must be different from it was 
when the place was perceived previously, encountering the place was a new 
experience of perceiving. Perceiving the familiar place might, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s words, deterritorialise the original memory and affect that involve the 
subject, and as every deterritorialisation is accompanied by a reterritorialisation 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 10), what this deterritorialisation leads to is a 
changed or expanded memory and affect concerning the subject. In other words, 
this triggered, or in Sean Watson’s words, actualised memory and emotion may 
change an existing piece of the person’s memory and affect. 
 
What the act of taking a photograph captures and documents in this case is a 
moment in which the photographer/viewer’s memory experiences a de-and-
reterritorialisation. However, as there must be a period of time consumed 
between the moment of photographing and the moment that the photograph 
physically comes into being, when she/he has the photograph to look at, all 
relevant elements would be in different states. The act of looking at the 
photograph becomes a task of perceiving the visual documentation of bygone 
states of the subject, and this means that the subject being perceived is different 
from the one (i.e. the subject in themselves) at the moment of photographing. 
Combined with the facts that the person’s memory would be in a different state, 
and the physical environment that she/he is in could be different, the memory and 
emotion triggered by looking at the photograph would again not be the same as 
the ones in the moment of photographing. Moreover, apart from shifting the 
becoming of the person’s memory on the subject which seem linear, looking at 
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the photograph could also trigger other elements of the moment of photographing 
such as the photographer’s thoughts and concerns at the time. 
 
Looking at a photograph taken by the viewer her/himself of place that she/he had 
encountered triggers multiple-layered movements in both the viewer’s memory 
and affect, as her/his initial memory and affect would experience at least two 
times of de-and-reterritorialisation (i.e. once at the moment of photographing, the 
other one in viewing the photograph). Therefore, instead of re-present the 
person’s memory and affect of the past, viewing a photograph creates a sense of 
the past that is revived and keeps being rewritten. The linear time view is hence 
ruptured because different points of the past would be de-and-reterritorialised at 
the same time when looking at the photograph. With the photographer/viewer’s 
familiar subject as the pivot, elements from different time and experiences could 
be triggered and connected into a rhizome from which new interpretations of the 
photograph and new movements in memory and affect within the person can be 
created. 
 
A photograph taken by me can be the example of this case. On 8th March 2018 
in Zhuhai, China, I took a photograph (Fig.3) in a restaurant that I often went to 
many years ago. At that moment, my attention was caught by the painting of 
horses on the wall as I suddenly realised that it had been there since 1996. It then 
triggered many memories of my childhood and started a nostalgic experience for 
me. I then took this photograph, hoping that it could recreate a scene of 1996 in 
my memory in future viewings. However, when this photograph was printed out 
in Glasgow several months later, looking at it became a complicated experience, 
as although the memories and affective state about 1996 were triggered again, 
they did not feel as strong as when I took the photograph in the restaurant. 
Together with my focus and concerns in Glasgow at the time, the triggered 
memories and affective movements formed an assemblage that did not have a 
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clear centre. The proportion between these three main elements and the 
connections between the nodal points (i.e. the objects and affect within them) 
change every time the photograph is being viewed. In some cases, looking at the 
photograph mainly triggered the memories of the 1990s whereas in other cases 
it primarily triggered the memory of the evening in 2018 when it was taken. 
Because my memory as a totality is different every time I look at the photograph, 
every viewing experience is a process of creating a new centre (i.e. the focus and 
interpretation) for the chaotic assemblage of memory and affect. It does not 
always create a scene that I longed for, and the later viewing experience 
somehow always contains the shadows of previous experiences. 
 
 
Fig.4 Street in Zhuhai, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, digital photography, 10 x 15cm. 
 
In the second case, the photograph is also taken by the viewer. Its main difference 
with the first case is that the photographer did not have any connections with the 
place before taking the photograph. This means, instead of being parts of a 
64 
 
narrative, meaning, or emotion that already exists in her/his mind, the subjects in 
this case are at the beginning of forming one as it is the first time that the 
photographer encounters and perceives them. Therefore, as she/he is directly 
selecting from and adjusting the subject, taking a photograph can be seen as an 
act of visually actualising the subject. Therefore, unlike the first case in which the 
photographer/viewer already has an existing ‘territory’ (i.e. memory and affect 
about the subjects) for the act of taking and viewing the photograph to de-and-
reterritorialise, taking and viewing a photograph in the second case is the start 
and process of creating a territory for her/him. 
 
Indeed, deciding to take a photograph might mean that the photographer has 
found something that interested her/him in the unfamiliar environment. By 
locating certain subjects with a frame and cutting them off from the whole picture, 
taking the photograph creates a squared image which, despite the relevant 
elements’ changing in states over time, always represents the encounter with the 
bygone states of several selected elements. As there must be a period of time 
consumed between the moment of photographing and the moment that the 
photograph physically comes into being, having a photograph to look at means 
that all subjects would have reached new states in their becoming. Even in a 
person’s mind, the chance of re-organising the memories into the exact states of 
the moment of encounter and find out the exact elements that triggered her/him 
to take the photograph is unlikely, if not impossible.  
 
Because the photographer/viewer’s memory would be expanded at the moment 
of viewing the photograph compared with it at the moment of taking it, and no 
subject can be the predominant centre through bonding with previous memories, 
every single experience of viewing the photograph should be seen as a task of 
perceiving the photographic image with a different memory. When in the act of 
viewing, the photograph, which is a centreless image that documents the static, 
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bygone, and isolated states of the subjects, assembles with the person’s memory 
and creates connections leading to the emergence of unexpected new foci of the 
photograph. New interpretations or meanings that centred around these new foci 
could then be composed. Although these new focuses, composed interpretations 
and meanings have the potential of triggering a nostalgic experience for the 
person by inciting her/his memory and affective movements, they might not 
actually have close connection with what really happened and how the person 
really felt at the moment. The photograph in this case is about the present rather 
than the past. 
 
This case of photographs can be represented by a piece that I took on 19h 
February 2018 (Fig.4). Although the photograph was taken in my home city of 
Zhuhai, it was the one and only time that I wandered into that community. In other 
words, the subjects were not pre-bonded with any part of my memory and taking 
the photograph was the one and only experience that I had with them. Therefore, 
unlike the first case in which the act of taking the photograph happens during an 
ongoing process of my existing memory’s de-and-reterritorialisation, the 
photograph in this case was taken at the moment when the entities (i.e. me as 
the photographer and the subjects) just started to encounter. From my 
perspective, the photograph was the result of the selection and adjustment that I 
made in perceiving the environment. However, when the photograph is printed 
out, all relevant subjects have reached different states. As a result, the 
photograph cannot represent anything in the present physical world, it is the 
shadow that remains while the body has gone. Instead of a representation, the 
photograph should be seen as an entity, or totality on its own, and this means, 
even for myself as the photographer, viewing a photograph is a new task of 
perceiving.   
 
Answering the questions triggered by viewing a photograph that seem 
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retrospective such as why did I decide to take this photograph is actually a task 
of composing an interpretation for the present. And in this way, answering these 
questions could create ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9) along which 
memory and affect could reach new states through achieving de-and-
reterritorialisation. For example, while writing about Fig.4 Photograph of a street 
in Zhuhai, China, 2018, I started to feel that what attracted me the most in the 
photograph was the old building at the centre, and the metal structure and the 
two cars on the two sides started to seem redundant. Accordingly, I started to 
wonder why did I choose to take the photograph at that location rather than a few 
steps forward, and what was the initial trigger and focus of the photograph? While 
finding the answer to the first question, I noticed that the beautiful shadow of the 
trees between the two cars was intact and excluding the structure and cars would 
have ruptured the shadow. This led to the emergence of another question of, did 
I deliberately include the entire tree shadow in the frame? The focus 
spontaneously shifted from the buildings to the tree shadow, which led to new 
questions around the new focus of the image.  
 
This endless wandering between questions gradually took my memory away from 
the moment of photographing into other moments and plots that involved similar 
old buildings and tree shadows. From a Deleuzoguattarian perspective, this 
viewing experience was a process of de-and-reterritorialisation, or the coexisting 
movements of molar and molecular. Different from the first case in which the 
existing territory being ruptured and reformed was my memory of certain 
subject(s), the aspect that being reterritorialised in this case was the memory of 
the moment of photographing. As the initial moment of photographing included 
binaries such as cause/effect and subjectivity/objectivity, recalling it can be seen 
as a movement of becoming a molar which is, as Deleuze and Guattari define 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 213-216), an arborescent structure which features 
binaries. During this process, molecular movement, or the thing ‘that flows or 
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flees, that escapes the binary organisation, the resonance apparatus, and the 
overcoding machine’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 216) happened, and how it 
escaped from the movement of recalling the moment and reaching other parts of 
the memory can be seen as a process of deterritorialising the memory of the initial 
moment of photographing. However, as every deterritorialisation is accompanied 
by a reterritorialisation (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 10), then a molecular 
movement would be nothing if it did not return to a molar organisation (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 216-7). The new elements in memory must form a new molar 
structure which functions as the interpretation of the moment of photographing.  
 
Instead of finding out what exactly happened and what was the reason for taking 
the photograph, answering the questions triggered by viewing a photograph in 
the second case is to make fabrications by selecting elements from the person’s 
memory and make connections between them. In this way, the movements in 
memory and affect triggered by viewing the photograph cannot be regarded as a 
reconstruction as they fundamentally do not aim to revive the original movement. 
In fact, looking at a photograph in the second case might trigger scenes that have 
never happened. Accordingly, in the cases which the viewer is nostalgic about 





Fig.5 Old building in Tianjin, unknown photographer, acquired from Shuyu Fang, 2018, 
digital photography, 10 x 15cm. 
 
In the first two cases, because the viewer is looking at a photograph that was 
directly generated from her/his own duration, viewing experiences in both cases 
unavoidably include a process of de-and-reterritorialisation although the 
elements being de-and-reterritorialised are different (in the first case it is the 
mixture of the memory of the familiar place and the moment of photographing, 
whereas it is solely the moment of photographing in the second case). As the 
image or reverie in the photographer/viewer’s mind that was triggered by viewing 
the photograph is, woven by the nodal points (i.e. the objects and plots in the 
photographer’s memory) which the photographer already has, it might create an 
illusion of re-presenting the facts of the past. Therefore, the distinctions between 
the past and the present, facts and imagination, subjectivity and objectivity in 
these two cases of viewing photographs seem blurred and ambiguous even 
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though the triggered image is always a new and non-repeatable construction. 
 
In the third case, the viewer is looking at a photograph of strange subject(s) taken 
by a stranger. This means, what she/he is looking at is a documented fragment 
of a bygone encounter between several unknown objects. Moreover, similar to 
the previous two cases, the physical existence of a photograph means that the 
photographer and subject(s) have all reached different states already. Therefore, 
for the viewer, the moment of photographing (i.e. the bygone encounter) cannot 
directly influence how she/he perceives the photograph as she/he did not take 
part in the encounter and it is impossible to retrieve it. This makes the photograph 
she/he perceives an entity on its own rather than the representation of something 
else.  
 
This case of photograph can be represented by Fig.5, which is a photograph that 
I acquired from another person. I did not know when and where the photographer 
took this photograph, but still, by viewing it, an impression that there must be a 
busy street in front of the building’s door was immediately triggered. This could 
be because the old brick building triggered my memory of living in a similar 
building by a busy street in the early 1990s. However, just as the triggered 
memory was about to develop further, I noticed the edge of a brick wall on the left 
side of the photograph. This directly cut off the newly formed connection between 
the old building in the photograph and my memory of the early 1990s by implying 
that it was another building rather than a street that the door was facing. Therefore, 
perceiving the photograph generated a rational recognition that the photograph 
was taken in a narrow alley between two old brick buildings.  
 
This rational recognition was not enough to trigger affective movements as it 
lacked the connections with my personal memory which, as discussed in Chapter 
one: section 1.2, has an unbreakable link with emotion. Therefore, in order to 
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trigger affective movements, the viewing experience after the rational 
identification became a browse of my memory with the intention of searching for 
elements that could directly connect to the identification. And gradually, fragments 
of memories of different events and times were triggered and organised into an 
affect-laden reverie which never happened in the physical world.    
 
Damian Sutton and David Martin-Jones use the image of a forest (i.e. the 
assemblage of trees) to illustrate how a rhizome includes rather than repels 
arborescent structures (Sutton and Martin-Jones, 2008: 4). From this perspective, 
being a rhizome on its own, my memory can be seen as an assemblage of the 
individual memories of my bygone experiences. Using Sutton and Martin-Jones’ 
metaphor, my memory as an entity is like a forest that contains the individual 
memories of bygone experiences. These memories are like the trees within the 
forest as they can be shaped into individual narratives yet none of them can be 
the absolute centre of the memory. 
 
Therefore, unlike the previous two cases in which viewing the photograph is 
bonded with certain ‘trees’ (e.g. my memory of taking the photograph and my 
memories of previous encounters with the subjects), in viewing a photograph of 
the third case, no particular ‘tree’ from the ‘forest’ can be seen as more relevant 
than the others through having a direct connection with the photograph’s 
production. As a result, what would be triggered is unpredictable, and the 
triggered elements have the potential of forming ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 9) along which the viewer’s memory enters the realm of 
imagination. Therefore, even if the triggered scene is nostalgic, it might not be 
about a period of time in the viewer’s past. Because instead of identifying an 
existing memory and adjust it into a scene, the viewer might need to use her/his 




3.2 The Three Projects 
 
3.2.1 The Barnes Series 
 
The Barnes Series was a selection of works made during the four months 
between May and September in 2018 at the Barnes Building of the Glasgow 
School of Art. Works in this series were mainly directed by material experiments, 
and one of the main findings was bringing encounters to my memory and affective 
state by articulating paints, in particular gesso paint, with photographs. Paintings 
in this series were started by finding the photographs that could trigger my 
nostalgic experiences. The painting was then directly made on the selected 
photographs. As they were visually changed, the nostalgic reverie that was 
triggered by the photographs were de-and-reterritoralised into other thoughts and 
affective states. In this way, I explored what a nostalgic reverie can become 
through painting.  
 
Gesso could play a vital role in this process. In what will be referred to as the 
gesso scraping method, the selected photograph that could trigger my nostalgic 
reverie was covered with a thin layer of gesso first, and after it was dry, a painting 
incited by the nostlagic reverie (using water-based paints such as acrylic and 
watercolours) was directly made on top of the gesso. Through being soaked by 
the paints, some parts of the gesso would become wrinkled and removable. By 
scraping these parts off with a palette knife, the photographic images beneath 
would be revealed and merged with the remining painting into a new image. Also, 
as I could not predetermine which parts of the gesso would become removable, 
how his memory and affect would be shaped by perceiving the new image was 
unpredictable. Accordingly, practice found a non-representative way that could 




In the paintings using this method, nostalgic reveries were deliberately triggered 
by attempting to find the ‘right’ photographs. Looking at a photograph required 
my memory as an entity to go through a selection and adjustment in order to form 
an interpretation or understanding of the photograph. Based on Henri Bergson’s 
duration theory which sees a person’s memory is a succession without distinction, 
an interpenetration of elements so heterogeneous that former states can never 
recur (Bergson, 2001: vii), my memory at the moment of being triggered by the 
selected photograph must be in a state that had never occurred before. Therefore, 
the nostlagic reverie triggered by looking at a photograph must be a new 
construction that cannot be repeated even though it seems to be the 
reappearance of something happened in the past. 
 
Based on Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy of rhizome, the nostalgic reverie 
triggered by looking at a photograph could be seen as a rhizome (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987), because although some objects could be clearly identified within 
the triggered reverie, there is no predetermined structure that organises these 
objects into one and only truth or right answer. In other words, the triggered 
nostalgic reverie does not represent a pre-existent image or understanding. 
Every viewing is a new articulation between the viewer’s memory, affect, and the 
photograph. Through selection and adjustment, pieces of these elements can be 
made into a complex patchwork from which different meanings and 
understandings can be made from different perspectives. It is indeed like Sutton 
and Martin-Jones have pointed out, whenever we explore thought (or, indeed, 
anything else) rhizomatically, there is always a deep ambiguity involved because 
as a shifting pattern, the rhizome is constantly creating lines of flight along which 
it can move into (and onto) new territories (Sutton and Martin-Jones, 2008: 6; 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9). Therefore, handling the materials such as paints, 
gesso and the photograph in this project was a way of shifting the triggered 




Accordingly, from a rhizomatic perspective, the aim of painting was to form a line 
of flight for the nostalgic reverie. Just as the nostalgic reverie was created through 
the articulation between my memory, affect, and the photograph, turning it into a 
static two-dimensional image requires me to make another articulation between 
the reverie and the paint itself. As discussed in Chapter One, the person’s 
memory plays a vital role in perceiving the world (Watson, 1998: 9). It could be 
argued that, whatever I painted was nostalgic because my memory was triggered 
into a nostalgic state by the photograph. Therefore, when facing the gesso 
covered photograph, I did not have to start the painting with a clear aim. The 
painting was directed by the nostalgic psychological state that I was in until the 
line of flight emerged. 
 
However, finishing the painting does not mark the end of the work, as it still 
needed to be scraped in order to merge, or articulate with the photographic 
images. This was the point where what Simon O’Sullivan defines as encounter 
(O’Sullivan, 2006: 1) happens. Because I could not decide which parts of the 
painted gesso would become removable and which parts of the photograph will 
be revealed by doing so, both the painting and the photograph were unexpectedly 
ruptured by the other through the scraping. While destroying each other’s integrity 
as an image, this mutual rupturing also created a new image by merging the 
remaining pieces. The new image, which was the mixture of the painting and the 
photograph, could move away from solely being the trigger, expression, or 
representation of the nostalgic reverie and trigger new thoughts and affective 
movements. 
 
Working in this way involves Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the double 
articulation between molar and molecular movements. In their philosophy, a 
molar structure is an aborescent structure which is featured by binaries such as 
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cause and effect, and molecular movements are the flows that ‘escape the binary 
organisation, the resonance apparatus, and the overcoding machine’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 216). Before scraping off the paint, both the painting and 
photograph can be seen as molar sturctures as they both are the results of linear 
aborescent movements in which the work (i.e. the tree) is caused by my idea or 
intention (i.e. the seeds). Through the application and removal of gesso, these 
two strucures were ruptured and their outcomes were broke into pieces and set 
in molecular movements which ‘has no aims other than unleash’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 275). However, Deleuze and Guattari also point out, a molecular 
movement would be nothing if it did not return to molar organisations (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 216-217). These pieces were bound to come together again 
to form a new static image which functioned as the ‘seed’ of other molar 
movements such as interpretations of the piece and new triggered memories.  
 
Also from the the perspective of Deleuze and Guattari’s pholosophy, both images 
are linked with the process of de-and-reterritorialisation. In taking a photograph, 
the photographer must make a selection from the environment that she/he is in 
(e.g. selecting the subjects) and adjust her/his relationships with the selected 
elements (e.g. finding the angle). As cognitive neuroscientist Michael Gazzaniga 
says, ‘Everything in life is memory, save for the thin edge of the present’ (Foster, 
2009: 2), thus selection and adjustment during photographing are largely based 
on the photographer’s memory at the moment. The photograph can be seen as 
generated through the connections between the photographer’s memory and the 
environment that she/he is in.  
 
These connections then form a memory of taking the photograph. A memory that 
the photographer would turn to when she/he is trying to answer the question of 
why did I take the photograph? However, if seeing the photographer’s memory 
as a whole as a rhizome, then this particular memory of taking a photograph 
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becomes one of the countless temporal nubs within it. It is formed through the 
connections between nodal points (e.g. the photographed objects and what they 
triggered in the photographer’s memory) while being a nodal point on its own can 
then be used to form other connections. Moreover, these connections do not form 
a stable territory within the photographer’s memory, as the connections within 
her/his memory are always changing in order to respond the things that she/he 
encounters. 
 
Although the photograph documents a static scene, as the viewer would be in 
different psychological and affective states in each viewing experience, the 
thoughts and affects triggered by each viewing the photograph would always be 
different. Instead of being the visual representation of a stable narrative, a 
photograph is like an entrance to an unknown territory. Whenever the 
photographer looks at a photograph taken by herself/himself, some pieces within 
her/his memory would be triggered into her/his’s mind and start to make 
connections. But as her/his memory as a whole must be different from the 
moment of photographing, and the photgraph cannot be regarded as the actual 
things that were photographed, every experience of viewing a photograph will be 
new and non-repeatable. What will be triggered and how these triggered things 
will be connected together are unpredictable to the photographer/viewer. Hence, 
looking at a photograph starts a de-and-reterritorialisation within the person’s 
memory. Certain objects are cut off from their original connections with others by 
doing so and form a new territory through making connections between 
themselves. 
 
In the works of The Barnes Series, the territories that formed by viewing 
photographs were nostlagic reveries. As looking at the selected photograph was 
a new perceiving experience, I could not foresee what elements would be 
triggered into my mind and what connections would be made by those triggered 
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elements. In most cases, the triggered reverie was an affect-laden chaotic 
patchwork formed by unexpectedly triggered objects. While inciting the painting, 
the triggered nostalgic reverie was difficult to be directly represented by a painting, 
as it always needed to be organised into a scene first so that the painting could 
have a clear model to depict. Even with this representational method, another 
layer of de-and-reterritorialisation would happen to the nostalgic reverie, because 
in order to become a clear scene for me to depict, the nostalgic reverie which is 
a chaotic bloc needs to be shifted or reterritorialised. 
 
In order to avoid using painting in a representational way, I directly started the 
painting without any predetermined aim. As I was in a nostalgic experience, every 
mark I painted was influenced by the nostalgic reverie. Even so, the painted 
marks still created their own material and visual effects such as the thickness of 
the paint, the shade of the colour, and the texture of the brushstroke. These 
material and visual effects gradually formed a line of flight along which the 
nostalgic reverie moved into the territory of painting. In this way, another layer of 
de-and-reterritorialisation was achieved through handling paint. The nostalgic 
reviere, which was the territory previously formed by looking at a static, two-
dimensional image (i.e. the selected photograph) was turned into another static, 
two-dimensional image (i.e. the painting).  
 
In the practices that involved the use of gesso, these two tasks of de-and-
reterritorialisation, the one triggered by viewing the selected photograph and the 
one achived by painting, were cleanly separated by the layer of gesso. Through 
blocking the photograph, I did not have to face the change of the nostalgic 
reverie’s trigger. Therefore, both viewing the photograph and making a painting 
from what was triggered by the viewing could be conducted in a relatively stable 
state. However, the clean separation also created a linear structure in which the 




Rupturing this linear structure and organising the elements together into a new 
territory was achieved by the scraping. As the photograph was the nostalgic 
reverie’s trigger and the painting was the nostalgic reverie’s effect, and both the 
processes of having the nosatlgic reverie and making the painting from it involved 
the de-and-reterritorialisation of my memory and affective state, there was an 
indirect connection between the two images centred around the nostalgic reverie 
within the linear strucure. Through the merge caused by scraping, this indirect 
relationship between the two images was ruptured and the linear structure 
became a horizontal rhizome. In this way, new thinkings and affective movements 
were generated by rethinking the relationship between the nostalgic reverie and 
the new formed image.  
 
The gesso scraping method neither solely emphasise medium’s specificity as 
Clement Greenberg (Frascina, Harrison and Paul, 1987, 308-314) promotes nor 
offers a new way of representing a predetermined blueprint. What it creates is 
connectivity that could horizontally merge painting, photograph, my memory and 
affect into a rhizome. The original identities or roles of these elements (e.g. the 
photograph being the trigger of a nostalgic experience) could be deterritorialised 
through this method and reterritorialised as a new hybrid entity. Although 
photography plays a vital role in it, the main contribution that the gesso scraping 
method makes is still to the field of painting. In discussing the definition of painting, 
James Elkins argues that painting ‘is a kind of immersion in substances, a wonder 
and a delight in their unexpected shapes and feels’ (2000: 188). The gesso 
scraping method was formed based on the new possibilities in handling paints, 
photographs and gesso that were found as I experimented with my materials. 
These new possibilities, in Elkins’ words, create a new way of beginning a 





Fig.6 Triptych using gesso scraping method, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, acrylic and gesso 







Fig.7 No Person of the Name at the Address, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, acrylic and gesso 
on photo paper, 21 x 30cm, pp.10 of the portfolio. 
 
 
Fig.8 You Think It’s That Easy?, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, acrylic and gesso on photo paper, 





Fig.9 Made a Mistake, Sorry, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, acrylic and gesso on photo paper, 
21 x 30cm, pp.12 of the portfolio. 
 
The gesso scraping method was firstly used in three 30cm x 21cm paintings 
(Fig.6-9). All three practices followed the same procedures. A photograph that 
could trigger a nostalgic reverie for me was selected and attached to a larger 
piece of blank photo paper first. The photograph was then covered by a thin layer 
of gesso before a painting incited by the nostalgic reverie triggered by it was 
made on top of the dried gesso. The last step was to reveal some parts of the 
photograph by scraping off the removable painted gesso. By doing so, the 
fragments of the photographs and the painting merged into an unforeseeable new 
image. 
 
All three selected photographs were taken by me, and the moments of taking 
them were the only encounters that I had with the subjects. At the moments they 
were taken, the decisions of taking the photographs were made based on my 
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memory and affective state at the moment. However, as my memory as a whole 
was in a different state and the photographs were entities on their own rather than 
the actual photographed objects, looking at the photographs were different 
experiences of perceiving. As a result, by looking at the photographs, the 
triggered memories did not strictly bond with the moments of taking the 
photographs. Memories outside the moments of photographing and even some 
imaginations were triggered during all three viewing experiences.  
 
Therefore, although under the triggered affects, the triggered objects indeed 
formed reveries that made me long for, as the connections between the objects 
were incoherent and in chaotic shifting, none of them could be represented by a 
single bygone event that I remembered. In order to avoid representational 
practice, I directly started to paint onto the gesso covered surface without a 
predetermined image or model. The painting was started by testing the colours 
that I felt right to express the affects at the moment. As handling paint might incite 
emotional movements and other wordless experiences for the painter (Elkins, 
2000: 188), the process of painting was also a process of shifting the nostalgic 
reverie triggered by viewing the photograph. While the painting was incited by my 
nostalgic reverie, my memory was in turn shifted by perceiving the painting. 
Accordingly, the painting gradually formed its own initiative and took me out of 
the nostalgic state and went in the direction of making a landscape painting.  
 
As making a landscape painting was not a predetermined plan, it was through 
the mutual shifting between the initial nostalgic reverie and handling paints that I 
encountered the images of recognisable objects (e.g. the buildings, the trees and 
the clouds) in the landscape painting. As these recognisable objects were 
heterogeneous and not connected in a predetermined way, the process of making 





A linear structure of a photograph triggered a nostalgic reverie which then 
generated a landscape painting was created. In order to rupture this linear 
structure and create new relationships between the nostalgic reverie and the two 
images, I scraped off the removable painted parts and revealed the photographic 
images beneath them. By doing so, the linear procedures of the practice were 
pressed into a flat image. The photograph, the nostalgic reverie, and the painting 
were all torn into pieces and merged into a new image, or a rhizome. The 
unexpectedly made juxtaposition between the painting and revealed 
photographic images created several coexisting binaries such as between the 
past and the present, between existed facts and imagination, and between 
mechanically printed and handmade images. Hence, viewing the work became a 
rhizomatic experience as what it triggered was both one and many, and finding 
an interpretation or meaning for the work required the viewer to mediate the 
chaotic binaries.   
 
As both the painted and photographic images were figurative, the juxtaposition 
between them made by the scraping created a sense of montage which means 
a sequence of shots that have been edited to follow each other in rapid 
succession in film and television. As this effect was not planned, the work cannot 
be regarded as to imitate movie stills. Rather, the scraping formed a line of flight 
along which the image entered the territory of film. Instead of retrieving the initial 
nostalgic reverie triggered by viewing the photograph, perceiving the new image 
created by scraping triggered a different memory of watching a 1986 film directed 
by Hou Xiaoxian called Dust in the Wind. By adding a line from the film in the 
format of subtitle to the painting, I finally felt that the work had included enough 
layers of memories. At this stage, the role of the nostalgic reverie triggered by the 
photograph was no longer the pivot that was caused by the photograph and 
triggered the painting, rather it had become part of a horizontally expanding 
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rhizome which through being viewed could shift and be shifted by other memories. 
 
As the three pieces were made within one day, the process of making the first 
painting set a basic tone in memory and affect for the next two. Along with the 
nostalgic reverie triggered by the photograph, the memory of watching the old 
film had also became a starting point for the painting. Although being another 
work physically, the later practice to a certain degree could be seen as a de-and-
reterritorialisation of my memory and affective state shifted by the previous 
practice. The three works can be seen as an entity for this continuity, and 
juxtaposing them became another channel of expanding the rhizome. 
 
 
Fig.10 Untitled, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, acrylic and gesso on photographs, 20 x 45cm, 
pp.3-9 of the portfolio. 
 
Unlike the triptych in which each practice dealt with one nostalgic experience. In 
another painting (Fig.10), the gesso scraping method was used to de-and-
reterritorialise a compound nostalgic experience. Six photographs that could 
trigger my nostalgic experiences were selected before the painting. In order to 
limit the influence of the nostalgic affect that was triggered by the previous 
selected photograph, I only made one selection per day. Every nostalgic 
experience triggered by the selected photographs was based on what was 
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triggered by the previous selected one. In other words, the later selection shifted 
rather than replaced the effects of the previous selection. Therefore, before 
viewing the six photographs as an entity, I was in a compound nostalgic 
experience. 
 
Viewing the six photographs as an entity created ambiguity in the distinction 
between the present and the past. Although all six photographs were in my 
memory already, as discussed in Chapter One: Section 1.6, even viewing a 
selected photograph again could not retrieve the nostalgic reverie that was 
triggered during the initial perceiving because my memory was in a different state. 
Also, because the six photographs were arranged together one by one rather 
than being cut and then made into a collage, their integrities as individual 
photographs were not ruptured by their combination, and their clean and rigid 
edges prevented them from merging into a coherent scene. Hence, although the 
new image was comprised of six familiar photographs, looking at it was a new 
experience of perceiving in which I simultaneously perceived six triggers that 
were mutually interfering with each other.   
 
This new viewing experience simultaneously triggered objects from the memories 
of all six selections into my mind. As these heterogeneous objects were 
centreless, my memory was shifted into a rhizomatic state by viewing the six 
photographs together. A rupture to the idea of time is linear was created by this 
new perceiving experience as my present, which was this new rhizomatic state 
in memory, to a certain extent was my past. In discussing Bergson’s philosophy 
of duration, Deleuze questions the distinction between the present and the past, 
as he says: 
 
We believe that the present is only past when it is replaced by another 
present. Nevertheless, let us stop and reflect for a moment: how would a 
new present come about if the old present did not pass at the same time 
that is present? How would any present whatsoever pass, if it were not past 
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at the same time as present? (1991: 58) 
 
My mind reached a new present by looking at the selected photographs as an 
entity. However, instead of making my previous states ‘the past’ by replacing them, 
this new present itself was comprised of some fragments from the previous states. 
From Bergson’s perspective, this viewing experience was an actualisation 
(Deleuze, 1991). My past was a virtual which means a totality that generated the 
actual, which in this case was the new state in memory. By invalidating the 
distinction between the present and the past, this experience of selecting, 
arranging and viewing photographs illustrated Eugene O’Neill’s luminous insight, 
‘the past is the present, isn’t it? It’s the future, too’ (1956). The desire of ‘going 
back to the past’ of the nostalgic experience was ruptured as I understood that 
the image of the past that I longed for was my present.  
 
As the nostalgic experience was ruptured by viewing the six photographs together, 
I started to paint on the gesso covered photographs based on the new rhizomatic 
state in memory. While the painting was generated from this new state, making 
the painting also shifted the state of my memory and affect. In Barbara Bolt’s 
words, handling paint as a process has the potential of taking on a life of its own 
that breathes, vibrates, pulsates, shimmers and generally runs away from the 
painter and makes her/him no longer have the awareness of time, of pain or of 
making decisions (Bolt, 2004: 1). This means, how would the act of handling paint 
shift my rhizomatic state in memory and affect triggered by viewing the 
photographs became unpredictable.  
 
In discussing the logic of handling paint, Bolt points out that because we are 
constantly in the process of making it for exhibition, promoting it, analysing it and 
writing about it, the work of art tends to be reduced to its equipmental-being. 
(2004: 188). In order to escape such instrumentalism, I did not set any clear aim 
for the painting. The painting progressed in its own logic and finished at a point 
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of being a smooth blue abstract image on the gesso covered photographs. Unlike 
the previous arrangement which combined the six photographs into one from the 
perspective of shape and size, the abstract painting visually merged the six 
photographs into one piece.  
 
By scraping off the removable parts of the painted gesso, parts of the covered 
photographic images were revealed and merged with the painting. However, the 
scraping unexpectedly cut off the connections between the revealed parts and 
the rest of the original photographs. Hence, as Fig.11 shows, even two revealed 
parts within the same photograph may have seemed incoherent. The gaps 
between the original framed territories of the photographs were nullified and all 
revealed parts became photographic images of their own. 
 
 
Fig.11 Detail of Untitled, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, acrylic and gesso on photograph, 10 x 
15cm, pp.9 of the portfolio. 
 
Through the scraping, both the painting and the photographs were de-and-
reterritorialised. Similar to Deleuze and Guattari’s example of the becoming-wasp 
87 
 
of an orchid and the becoming-orchid of a wasp in the act of pollination (1987: 
10), the ruptured painting became a bond that unified the revealed photographic 
images while the revealed photographic images became the hints of the 
painting’s interpretation. The new image formed by the two images can be seen 
as a new rhizome. Viewing it became a channel through which connections 
between memories, interpretations, imaginations and affect can be made. 
 
 
Fig.12 Her Writings, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, acrylic and writings on photographs, 34 x 





Fig.13 Detail of Her Writings, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, acrylic and writings on photographs, 
34 x 87cm, pp.28-30 of the portfolio. 
 
In some other cases of the Barnes Series, the nostalgic experiences as the 
subjects of the paintings were unexpectedly encountered rather than deliberately 
sought. Compared with the works discussed previously which were made without 
any predetermined plan, these paintings were made with a clear tactic. The 
paintings were started off by visualising the encountered nostalgic experiences. 
These tasks could be defined as molar structured as they were featured by binary 
aggregates such as representation (Bolt, 2004: 45). Based on Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theory of double articulation between the molar and the molecular 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 216-217), the aims of handling paint in these cases 
were to find the aimless molecular flows that runs away from the nostalgic 
experiences until they moved into new molar structures which could be new 





These pieces could be represented by Her Writings (Fig.12). Unlike the practices 
discussed previously, the objects and plots of the nostalgic reverie that this piece 
started with were particularly clear although how they would be triggered was 
unknown. As I could clearly identify the objects in this nostalgic reverie were my 
high school, the community that I had lived in during that time, and some 
sentences from the works of an amateur writer that I enjoyed reading back then, 
the original plan of the practice was to visualise this reverie. Accordingly, the aim 
of selecting and arranging photographs was to visually represent the objects, and 
the aim of painting was to change the photographs into the states in the nostalgic 
reverie.   
 
The original plan was typically representational; however, it was immediately 
ruptured after I tried to represent my high school and the community that I had 
lived in with photographs. I acquired three photographs of the exact classroom of 
my high school from another person and found several photographs of the 
community through browsing my photo album. However, as the photographs of 
the classroom were taken in 2018, and the ones of the community were taken in 
2016, none of them documented the objects’ states in 2006 which was the time 
that the nostalgic reverie was about. In this way, looking at the photographs 
became a task of making articulations between my memory at the moment of 
making this piece and the relevant objects in states other than they were in 2006. 
As a result, instead of visualising the nostalgic reverie as I expected, looking at 
the photographs triggered thoughts and affective movements that had never 
occurred before which unexpectedly shifted the direction of practice.  
 
Theoretical physicist Lee Smolin points out that, human beings perceive time as 
change (Smolin, 2014: 28). Even from the perspective of facts, there would be 
changes between an object’s state in 2018 than it was in 2006. As discussed in 
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Chapter One: Section 1.1, because a nostalgic reverie is beautified and imagined 
rather than the reappearance of bygone facts, it should be seen as a new creation. 
The task of using photographs taken in 2016 and 2018 to represent a nostalgic 
reverie based on a memory of 2006 unavoidably involved several layers of 
differences such as the one between the objects’ actual states in the two times 
and the one between the objects in the nostalgic reverie and the objects in the 
photographs. As a result, when viewing the arranged photographs as a whole, 
along with the images, I was also perceiving these differences. The articulation 
between my memory and the photographs results in thoughts, imaginations, and 
affective movements outside the nostalgic reverie. The nostalgic reverie was 
ruptured in this way and the practice was no longer heading to represent a 
predetermined model. 
 
Based on Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the molar and molecular movement, 
if seeing the plan of visualising the nostalgic reverie with photographs as a task 
of building a molar structure, then it was through these differences that the 
molecular escapes started to flow (Deleuze and Guattari 1987:216-217). In this 
way, the nostalgic reverie formed by several selected objects was deterritorialised 
by finding the photographs that document the objects’ different states. By 
extending my thoughts and affective movements into other territories, the 
differences in triggered outcomes turned the stably formed nostalgic reverie into 
a centreless rhizome.  
 
Painting became the means of achieving the reterritorialisation or another molar 
structure. Unlike the previously discussed practices in which the nostalgic 
reveries were deliberately triggered by finding the right photographs, the nostalgic 
reverie in this case was unexpectedly encountered. Instead of being the trigger 
of nostalgic reveries which incited the painting, the photographs in this practice 
incited painting by directly making articulations with my memory and created new 
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thoughts and ideas about the nostalgic reverie through painting to handle.  
 
Instead of using the gesso scraping method again, the painting in this case was 
directly made on the photographs. This means, while forming a painted image, 
the brushstrokes were also in the process of creating juxtapositions with the 
photographic images beneath. There were struggles in this process as some 
brushstrokes might create juxtapositions that needed to be adjusted, and these 
adjustments might become the starting point of unplanned directions for the 
painting. Therefore, unlike the previously discussed works in which the painting 
was finished on a white surface (i.e. the dry gesso that covered the photographs) 
first before it was merged into a rhizome along with the photographic image 
revealed by scraping off the gesso, painting in this case was a process of creating 
a rhizome with the photographs, and the struggle with the photographs became 
part of the practical logic that incited its progression. 
 
Every brushstroke was a shift to the connections between the nodal points within 
the rhizome. However, by exampling how the native culture of the New World was 
forcefully reterritorialised by the European settlers, Damian Sutton and David 
Martin-Jones argue that de-and-reterritorialisation might not happen when the 
powers of the two sides are unequal (2008: 7). When a strong rhizome 
encounters a weaker rhizome, the weaker one is often absorbed, or forcefully 
reterritorialised by the strong one’s culture (Sutton and Martin-Jones, 2008: 7-8). 
As it was an obvious imbalance between the two images at the beginning of the 
practice, the first few brushstrokes were difficult to provide great change to the 
rhizome woven by the photographs. Accordingly, while incited by my intention, 
the painting also progressed under the influences, or even deterritorialisations of 
the photographs. It completed at a point where the painted marks had found the 
way to escape from the deterritorialisation of the photographs and formed a new 
territory of its own. But the finishing point was a fine line, as crossing it too much 
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might result in the photographs in turn being dominated by the painting. It was at 
this point that the two images merged into one piece through mutually rupturing 
and reaffirming. As a result, the rhizome that was created by the articulation 
between the nostalgic reverie and the photographs was hence moved onto other 
territories by viewing this new piece. 
 
Starting with a representational aim of visualising the nostalgic reverie, by 
selecting the photographs of its objects taken in other times the practice 
encountered its first de-and-reterritorialisation when the nostalgic reverie was 
shifted into a centreless rhizome. The paintings then started to change and be 
changed by this rhizome until a point where the powers between the two images 
became balanced and a new rhizome was formed through the mutual de-and-
reterritorialisation between them. Because the work of an amateur writer that I 
enjoyed reading was a main object of the initial nostalgic reverie, some sentences 
from them were written on the newly merged image. By doing so, the trigger of 
the initial nostalgic reverie was put in a new visual context. New emotions and 






Fig.14 The reterritoriailisation of The Barnes Series, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, mixed 
medium, variable size, pp.39-43 of the portfolio. 
 
 
Fig.15 Detail of the reterritoriailisation of The Barnes Series, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, 




In early September 2018, I gathered all pieces that I made between May and 
August, broke their chronological orders of making and re-arranged the 
fragments into a new piece on a wall (Fig.14). To me, every individual work 
contained the memory of the process of de-and-reterritorialising a nostalgic 
reverie (i.e. a state of my memory). Therefore, merging them into one piece meant 
that while both the original pieces and the memories of making them were 
deprived of their individual identities, the linear order of their happening was also 
ruptured and reaffirmed. Similar to the function of scraping the gesso, the linear 
order of making one piece after another during the four months were pressed into 
a rhizome in which no memory nor work could be predetermined as the centre. 
As a result, the ruptured parts and the several layers of memories that triggered 
by them such as the original nostalgic reveries and the memories of the practice 
all became nodal points for making new connections. Therefore, when viewing 
the work, viewers need to construct their own focuses of the piece. By being 
articulated with the work (i.e. making selection, adjustment, and connections 
within this chaotic image), viewers’ memory and affect could reach new states. In 
this way, the works that started with the aim of exploring my nostalgic experiences 
formed into an image that, instead of illustrating the scenes in the reverie or telling 
conclusions that were formed by me, triggers more experiences that the viewers 
can be experience. 
 
3.2.2 Wish You Were Here 100 
 
The project Wish You Were Here 100 was an exhibition held at the PhD project 
space in Tontine Building of the Glasgow School of Art from 15th-27th January 
2019 (Fig.16-17). The exhibited works were one hundred postcard format 
paintings made within a week in December 2018. Unlike The Barnes Series in 
which the works were mainly started with material experiments, works in the Wish 
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You Were Here 100 project had a strict form to observe. All one hundred works 
were 11.7 x 17cm in size, with an acrylic painted photograph in the middle and a 
line of text describing the nostalgic reverie written below the painting. The works, 
which explored the becoming of my nostalgic reveries, were associated with 
experience sharing and adopted some features of mass production. Therefore, 
the task of exploring personal memory and emotions were conducted within the 
connections between personal emotions, standardised products and souvenirs 
that people use to share feelings and experiences.  
 
 
Fig.16 Wish You Were Here 100, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings on 




Fig.17 Detail of Wish You Were Here 100, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings on 
photographs, variable size, pp.44-60 of the portfolio. 
 
 
Fig.18 Hot and Damp, a City in Jungle, 1994, Guangzhou, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, acrylic 




Hot and Damp, a City in Jungle, 1994, Guangzhou  
 
In the most common cases of this project, the painting started with the aim of 
shifting the photograph into an image that visualised the triggered nostalgic 
reverie. These cases could be represented by Hot and Damp, a City in Jungle, 
1994, Guangzhou (Fig.18). The photograph in this practice was taken by me in 
2016 in Guangzhou of a community that I had lived in for two years in early 1990s. 
Looking at the photograph triggered a compound affect for me, as elements from 
both the memories of the early 1990s and the moment of taking it in 2016 were 
triggered in my mind at the same time. The memories of the two years of living in 
Guangzhou in the early 1990s had often been the materials that I used to create 
my nostalgic reveries. However, the visit in 2016 during which I took the 
photograph ruptured the nostalgic reveries about the place as during the visit I 
personally confirmed that many elements in the nostalgic reveries were purely 
imagined. As a result, the connections between the triggered elements from the 
conflict experiences formed a chaotic and irrelevant entity. What was triggered 
should not be seen as a juxtaposition formed by the reappearances of two 
individual pieces of my memory, as according to Henri Bergson, a person’s 
memory is an undividable succession without distinction (Bergson, 2001: vii). 
Although it was unstable and centreless, the triggered reminiscences and 
imaginations were still an undividable entity. 
 
The triggered state of my memory had the four features of the rhizome (i.e. 
connectivity, heterogeneous, multiplicity, developed in unforeseen direction) 
theorised by Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 7-10). Firstly, the triggered entity was 
heterogeneous. The coexistence between the nostalgic reveries and the memory 
of disappointment means that the triggered entity included the reappearances of 
bygone facts, imaginations, and both positive and negative affects. Secondly, 
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these triggered elements were not simply being set out in my mind, they were 
making all sorts of connections which incited my thoughts and affective 
movements. Thirdly, the triggered entity was not a stable state as there was no 
structure that ordered the connections between the elements. Hence, there was 
no pre-determined centre in the triggered entity. Just as Eugene Holland says, 
‘there are no pre-determined positions or points within a rhizomatic multiplicity, 
only lines along with random nodes arising at the haphazard intersection of them’ 
(Holland, 2013: 39). Finally, the lack of the ordering of a pre-determined structure 
means that the development of the triggered entity could not be foreseen.   
 
Painting became the means of territorialisation or coding through which the 
triggered entity, which was an indeterminate number of metastable states 
reached a temporary and derivative stable state. The aim of painting in this 
practice was to change the photograph into an image that visualised the nostalgic 
reverie. However, as the nostalgic reverie was mixed with the memory of 
disappointment, the painting did not have a set model to visualise therefore this 
plan could not be considered as representational. As painting directly on the 
photograph means that the progression of painting would be influenced by the 
photograph and what it triggered, and these elements would in turn be changed 
by the following painted images, painting in this case was the means that directly 
led the direction of the triggered rhizome’s development into an image that could 
trigger only my nostalgic reverie. 
 
Simon O’Sullivan points out that the rhizome names a principle of connectivity 
(O’Sullivan, 2006: 17). From this perspective, making painting on the photograph 
could also be seen as a process of expanding the triggered rhizome because in 
this way, pigments as nodal points were connected to the photograph, and the 
triggered rhizome was given another perspective of components. This enriched 
the heterogeneity and multiplicity of the rhizome, and created more possibilities 
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in making connections between the nodal points.  
 
But this expansion created by painting was not all rhizomatic, as the paints were 
added to the photograph under my intentions, they did not develop, or expand 
the triggered rhizome in a purely random way. Directed by my intention, painting 
in this practice could be seen as a molar movement (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
216-21) as it aimed to turn a centreless rhizome into a ‘seed’ that could cause a 
set effect (i.e. a nostalgic reverie). However, as I had to directly perceive the 
changes of the image during the painting process, my intentions were constantly 
ruptured by the changes of the image. For example, from the material perspective, 
the strong juxtaposition between the smooth surface of the photograph and a 
textured painted mark could incite me to temporarily shift away from the original 
intention and make a mark solely for the aim of mediating the juxtaposition. In this 
way, painting found a way of escaping the original molar movement of achieving 
a predetermined plan and joined the molecular movement (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 216-21) which had no particular aim until it reached a point where I could 
find a new direction for it.  
 
As a result, in Barbara Bolt’s words, the painting gradually shifted away from the 
original plan of becoming a trigger of nostalgic reverie, took on a life of its own 
(Bolt, 2004: 1) and reached a point where I felt that the image was finished. This 
was the point that painting had accomplished the task of ‘making consolidation 
out of the amorphous soup of becomings’ (Holland, 2013: 56). Instead of solely 
triggering my nostalgic reverie or the memory of disappointment, the finished 
image took my memory and affect to a new stable state, and it was in this state 





Fig.19 I Walked Past an Entire District, 2009, Beijing, Rongwei Zhang, 2018, acrylic and 
writing on photograph, 11.7 x 17cm, pp.53 of the portfolio. 
 
I Walked Past an Entire District, 2009, Beijing 
 
My memory and the photographed community in Hot and Damp, a City in Jungle, 
1994, Guangzhou (Fig.18) can be seen as two individual rhizomes as they are 
both expanding and shifting in a nonstop and unpredictable way. Therefore, Hot 
and Damp, a City in Jungle, 1994, Guangzhou (Fig.18) can be seen as generated 
from the multiple articulations between these two rhizomes. Through the 
repetition of going back to the community, the becoming of both the rhizome and 
the community became prominent, and my initial memory and understanding of 
the community were ruptured into an unstable state. Instead of documenting a 
moment in which a piece of memory was triggered into my mind, the photograph 
was generated from the conflict between recognising the objects in the initial 
memory and the ruptures to the initial memory created by encountering the 
objects’ new states. With the initial memory as the pivot, these conflicting 
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connections formed a chaotic, unstable, and centreless patchwork which needed 
further territorialisation to achieve a new stable state. By being a channel through 
which I could continue this unfinished becoming, the photograph was naturally 
connected to certain objects and the connections between them.  
 
In the cases where the selected photographs were taken during the only 
encounter between the subjects and I, the thoughts and memory triggered by 
looking at the photograph did not necessarily have a strong connection with the 
moment of taking it. For example, as the moment of photographing was the only 
encounter between the photographed buildings and I, from the perspective of 
bygone facts, the photograph used in I Walked Past an Entire District, 2009, 
Beijing (Fig.19) had nothing to trigger apart from the moment of photographing. 
Unlike Hot and Damp, a City in Jungle, 1994, Guangzhou (Fig.18) in which the 
photograph was generated from a chaotic and centreless patchwork woven by 
multiple connections between relevant objects formed from multiple times of 
visiting, the photograph in this case was the product of a one-time articulation 
between my memory at the moment and the photographed buildings.  
 
From a rhizomatic perspective, the results of this articulation, no matter what they 
were (e.g. thoughts, imaginations, and affects), must be temporary as the 
rhizome (i.e. my memory) was, and still is, constantly making new connections 
within itself in response to encounters with other objects. Based on Henri 
Bergson’s duration theory, the results of this articulation could not be recurred 
preciously as no former state of a duration can be recurred (Bergson, 1964: 48). 
As my memory had been becoming for nine years when the photograph was used 
in a painting in 2018, the result of the articulation at the moment of photographing 
had already changed during the becoming and could not be recurred. Hence, 
there was nothing in my memory to retrieve by looking at the photograph in this 




Although the photograph was taken by me, it had become an object on its own, 
and looking at it should be seen as the start of a brand-new articulation rather 
than the continuation of an unfinished becoming like the case in the previously 
discussed piece. The articulation between my memory and the photograph 
resulted in a reverie that I longed for, therefore the triggered objects that formed 
the reverie were from different events that did not have a direct link with the 
photographed buildings. Instead of entering an existing rhizome, looking at the 
photograph created a new rhizome in which the photographed buildings were not 
more predominant than other triggered objects. The connections between these 
triggered objects mainly resulted in comforting affects, but as they were irrelevant, 
the reverie that they formed was heterogeneous and unstable. 
 
The intention of painting on the photograph in this practice was to direct the 
becoming of the newly triggered rhizome into a stable state by making changes 
to one of its nodal points. By being painted on, the photograph’s original identities 
such as a digital printed image and documentation of some buildings’ state in 
2009 were ruptured and the new image created an opening for new thoughts, 
imagination, and affects to emerge. Through replacing some of the initially 
triggered objects with unexpected ones and changing the connections between 
them, these newly emerged ideas and emotions shifted the initial rhizome 
triggered by looking at the photograph.  
 
As there was no model as the predetermined aim for painting to realise, the 
destination of the painting was unknown and the process was struggling. It 
finished at a point when the image triggered my memory of a particular event in 
which I walked through an entire district in Beijing to find a train station. This was 
the moment in which the photograph, which had lost its original connection with 
my memory, had found a way of articulating with my memory again and 
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generated a stable connection. This connection provided new perspectives of 
looking at both the photograph and the memory of walking through the district, 
forming a territory with the two elements. In the Aesthetics of Affect, Thinking Art 
Beyond Representation, Simon O’Sullivan argues that, 
 
Art is less involved in making sense of the world and more involved in 
exploring the possibilities of being, of becoming, in the world. Less involved 
in knowledge and more involved in experience, in pushing forward the 
boundaries of what can be experienced. (O’Sullivan, 2001: 130) 
 
Indeed, the new territory formed by the painting could not be seen as a 
discovered fact or concrete knowledge, but the process of creating it did expand 
my affective experiences and provide possibilities of manipulating memory’s 
becoming with photographs and painting. 
 
 
Fig.20 Landscapes Covered by Tales, 2008-2009, Hangzhou/Beijing, Rongwei Zhang, 





Landscapes Covered by Tales, 2008-2009, Hangzhou/Beijing 
 
In some cases, the work was started by deliberately collaging two photographs 
taken from different places at different times. These cases could be represented 
by Landscapes Covered by Tales, 2008-2009, Hangzhou/Beijing (Fig.20) which 
was a piece started by making a collage with a photograph taken in Beijing in 
2009 and a photograph taken in Hangzhou in 2008.  
 
Both selected photographs could trigger my nostalgic reverie. In other words, to 
me, both articulations between my memory and the photographs resulted in 
beautiful and comforting thoughts and affects. However, from the perspective of 
bygone facts, there were big differences between the two periods of time in which 
the two photographs were taken such as the places, the seasons, and my focus 
in life. If seeing my memory as a rhizome, then the memories of the two periods 
of times were like two relatively stable yet indirectly related connections, that were 
formed by the objects within the rhizome.  
 
Under the coherent and linear structure of my experiences, the objects within a 
connection like this can be seen as homogeneous. As the two triggered nostalgic 
reveries were generated from these two indirectly related connections, each 
reverie had its own uniqueness. When the two photographs were being looked at 
side by side at the same time, the heterogeneity between the triggered objects 
created ruptures to both nostalgic reveries. As a result, similar to Hot and Damp, 
a City in Jungle, 1994, Guangzhou in which the selected photograph triggered a 
reverie mixed from two pieces from my memory, the two reveries in this case lost 
their original uniqueness and identities and merged into one centreless rhizome.  
 
Both making collage with the two photographs and painting directly on them 
became means of directing the development of this rhizome, and the initial aim 
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of this directing was to create a new centre, or a molar structure within it. As I put 
a boundary on myself that the work must be in the format of a postcard, the 
collage and painting needed to be made strictly within a squared territory. 
Because the two triggered nostalgic reveries were equally important in this 
practice, the powers between the two photographs on this territory of collage 
needed to be balanced. This means, the new centre would be created through 
the mutual de-and-reterritorialisations between the two photographs rather than 
one being absorbed by the other. Making the collage became a task of creating 
a ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9) through which the two 
photographs could move into each other.  
 
This line emerged as the trees from the two photographs started to merge. While 
the juxtaposition on the lower part between the grass and the building still clearly 
ruptured the visual coherence, the merging of the trees created a channel through 
which the image of Hangzhou in 2008 merged with the image of Beijing in 2009. 
Through balancing the coherence and incoherence between the two photographs, 
the collage created an ambiguity between being one work or two. This further 
provided new perspectives of looking at the relationships between the memories 
and nostalgic reveries triggered by them, as while the upper part of the image 
could trigger a coherent memory as it seemed intact, the lower part would rupture 
that triggered memory by creating questions or imaginations with its incoherence. 
Therefore, what was triggered by looking at the collage also became ambiguous 
and needed new thoughts in order to achieve stability.  
 
The juxtaposition between the merged trees and the clean cut between the grass 
and building became, in Barbara Bolt’s words, an opening in which new thoughts 
for the relationship between the two memories could emerge (Bolt, 2004: 91). At 
this point, the initial aim of achieving a centre, or molar structure through making 
collage and painting was abandoned, because there was no right or wrong in 
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interpreting the connections between the two memories, having a channel for 
connecting them and inciting new thoughts was more important than defining an 
answer. As a result, painting unexpectedly lost the leading position in the initial 
plan, it was only used limitedly to strengthen the merging of the trees. Through 
handling the two nostalgic reveries triggered by photographs taken from 
difference places at different time, a direct link between the two formerly unrelated 
memories was created, new thoughts and affective movements could be incited 
by it. 
 
Arranging the Works and Expanding the Rhizome 
 
Every practice in this project was a change to my memory and affect. As the one 
hundred pieces were made within a week, the pace of these changes was fast. 
Accordingly, a later painting was often started from the memory and affect 
changed by the previous painting. In this sense, although physically the works 
were individuals, there was a sense of continuity that ran through the entire one 
hundred practices and wove them into an entity. However, this continuity should 
not be seen as linear. The discussions on the selected pieces have indicated that 
the direction of the practices did not always follow my intentions. By creating ‘lines 
of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9), a practice often escaped from my 
original intentions and moved into other territories.  
 
The nostalgic reverie that incited the practice was de-and-reterritorialised, and 
my memory as a whole reached a new state in an unexpected way. It was based 
on this unexpected new state of memory that I started the next practice, and it 
was this unpredictability that prevented two contiguous practices from becoming 
the cause and effect. Every practice was an articulation between the selected 
photograph and my memory and affect as a whole rather than with the piece of 
making the previous work only, and there were always unexpected connections 
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emerging during this process. Although there might be connections between two 
contiguous practices in painting methods and visual effects, the paintings were 
not led by rational causality which determined the direction of practice. 
 
As the process of making the second work might generate its own new ‘seed’ 
which could incite the third practice by creating molecular escapes which ended 
in unexpected territories, even the first work should not be regarded as the 
project’s fundamental ‘seed’ which caused effects directly in the final piece of 
work. None of the one hundred pieces could be seen as the centre of this entity, 
and the direction of the project’s development was unforeseeable. 
 
Based on these features (i.e. connectability, heterogeneous, multiplicity, and 
developing in unforeseen directions), the week of practice could be seen as a 
process of creating a rhizome, and the works were the intersections between the 
connections between memories, affect, photographs, and paint. Simon 
O’Sullivan points out that the rhizome names a principle of connectivity, and the 
making of connections might be understood as a key modality of creativity in 
general (O’Sullivan, 2006: 17).  
 
 
Fig.21 The arrangement of the pieces from Wish You Were Here 100, Rongwei Zhang, 




Selecting the works and arranging them into different orders (Fig.21) became 
another channel of making multi-layered connections between the handmade 
quality of the images and the format of mass-produced postcard, between 
different visual effects, different memories and affects, different writings, and most 
importantly, between these heterogeneous elements. Also indicated by 
O’Sullivan, ‘although ‘art’ can name an object, we might also use it as a name for 
these pragmatic processes of connectivity and interpenetration.’ (O’Sullivan, 
2006: 17) While being a process of perceiving, looking at the arrangement of the 
works could also be another endeavour of making art because by looking at the 
arranged works, the viewer’s memory and affect, which is another rhizome, would 
join the connections and interpenetrations between the works.  
 
Similar to the articulation between my memory and affect and a select photograph 
in the initial triggering of a practice, the new formed connections created by 
viewing the arranged works are not explicit knowledge as they are based on 
personal experiences and subject to attitudes and feelings. Through expanding 
the viewer’s anamnestic and affective experiences, viewing the works would 
incite the becoming of the viewers’ memory and affect and take them into new 
states. Although the new formed connections do not necessarily have a physical 
body, they still possess the qualities that define art pointed out by O’Sullivan such 
as exploring the possibilities of being, of becoming, and pushing forward the 
boundaries of what can be experienced (O’Sullivan, 2001: 130). 
 
Finding the Body without Organs 
 
Contemporary psychologists and researchers such as Constantine Sedikides, 
Tim Wildschut, and Clay Routledge analyse nostalgia separately from its history, 
trigger, content, and functions (Sedikides et al. 2008: 304-307; 2006: 197-215). 
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In this way, a sense of identity, or ‘self’, is given to nostalgia and a certain 
relationship between the past and present is decided according to this identity. 
By contrast, through deterritorialising rather than creating identities for the 
nostalgic reveries, the one week of practice as an entity achieved what Deleuze 
and Guattari called a ‘Body without Organs (BwO)’ (1987: 149). 
 
In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari indicate that, 
 
A body without organs is not an empty body stripped of organs, but a body 
upon which that which serves as organs is distributed according to crowd 
phenomena, in Brownian motion, in the form of molecular multiplicities. 
Thus, the body without organs is opposed less to organs as such than to 
the organisation of the organs insofar as it composes an organism. 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 30) 
 
As the practice was centred around, or pushed forward by several elements such 
as the triggered nostalgic reveries, the interpretations of these reveries, and the 
affects triggered alongside them, these elements could be considered as the 
organs of the project. Just as Deleuze indicates, instead of stripping these organs 
off the initial body, handling paint and photographs was a process of setting these 
organs into molecular movements from their original states and the connections 
between them. Through creating lines of flight along which these organs could 
interpenetrate, they lost their original identities and functions and merged into a 
state which Deleuze illustrated with the image of an egg and describes, ‘“No 
mouth. No tongue. No teeth. No larynx. No esophagus. No belly. No anus.” It is a 
whole nonorganic life, for the organism is not life, it is what imprisons life’ 
(Deleuze, 2017: 33).  
 
Instead of simply being a positive or negative emotion that functioned as the ‘seed’ 
that caused the specific painting, the nostalgic reveries triggered by the selected 
photographs and started the paintings formed a continuity that connected the one 
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hundred works and turned them into a body without organs by tracing levels or 
thresholds in it according to the variations of its amplitude (Deleuze, 2017: 33). 
Accordingly, instead of representing some predetermined images or conclusions, 
the works became an ‘affective athleticism’ on which viewers can find new 
affective experiences, as Deleuze says, a sensation will be produced when the 
wave encounters the forces acting on the body (Deleuze, 2017: 34). 
 
3.2.3 The Labyrinth 
 
The Barnes Series explored the potential of directing the painter’s nostalgic 
reveries by manipulating materials and Wish you were here 100 found a way of 
achieving the Body without Organ in dealing with multiple nostalgic experiences. 
With the intention of combining these two experiences in one practice, I started a 
project called The Labyrinth (Fig.22-23) which comprised of three main parts of 
practices. 
 
Unlike Wish You Were Here 100, I did not put any boundary on the form of the 
work of The Labyrinth. Painting and my nostalgic reveries mutually de-and-
reterritorialised each other during the process. While the nostalgic reverie was 
changed by being painted, the methods and procedures of painting was also 
changed by the shifting of nostalgic reveries. Instead of finishing at the point 
where the initial nostalgic reverie was de-and-reterritorialised into another 
psychological state, painting continued to de-and-reterritorialise the next 
encountered affective state. Similar to a rhizome which is always in a process of 
becoming and sending out roots and shoots (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 21), 
the work does not have an end nor a set size and shape. It did not visualise the 
map of a labyrinth of memory and affect that pre-existed in my mind. Rather, the 





Fig.22 The Labyrinth, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings on photograph collage, 
variable size, pp.61-78 of the portfolio. 
 
 
Fig.23 The Labyrinth in studio, Rongwei zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings on photograph 
collage, variable size, pp.63 of the portfolio. 
 
The practice started with an encountered rather than deliberately sought 
nostalgic reverie. Based on the experiences of the previous two projects, the 
nostalgic reverie was seen as an undividable bloc in becoming rather than a 
collection of the static images of some concrete objects. Instead of picking out 
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the specific element from a collection, every attempt of identifying an object from 
the nostalgic reverie was a process of consolidating a being from the becoming 
through coding and territorialisation. The consolidated being, or identified object 
was a temporary created image rather than the representation of a pre-existing 
object, and the patchwork that formed by these created images could not 
represent the nostalgic reverie as the connections between them must be newly 
created.  
 
The attempt of identifying an object from the nostalgic reverie was a process of 
de-and-reterritorialisation through which the nostalgic reverie as an entity was 
shifted into a different image. The objects consolidated from this nostalgic reverie 
were a computer game, a community, and a history storybook. Although these 
images of objects were all formed by other elements, they should be defined as 
molar structures rather rhizomes because the elements in them were organised 
centred around one and only core. Visualising and merging these heterogeneous 
objects into one static image using painting and photographic collage became a 
task of dismantling several molar structures and create a new one by making new 
connections between the fragments.  
 
The first step in creating this body of work was to set the molar structures into 
aimless molecular escapes. Instead of following my deliberately made plan, the 
molecular escapes happened unexpectedly when two of the molar structures 
formed a connection by being thought about at the same time. From Simon 
O’Sullivan’s perspective (2006: 1), this connection could be seen as an encounter 
between the two molar structures as both parts were ruptured by the other and 
unexpected new thoughts and ideas were generated during the re-affirmation. 
For example, as a battle happened in 260 BC during which, according to Sima 
Qian’s Record of the Grand Historian, over 400,000 captives were executed was 
the mutual subject of both the computer game and the story book, it was 
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generated and became another key element of the practice when the game and 
book were being connected. The initial beautiful and personal nostalgic reverie 
reached the territory of history and archaeology and was added with a sense of 
brutality and horror.  
 
Through making connections between each other, the nodal points consolidated 
from the initial nostalgic reverie further created unexpected new nodal points. As 
these heterogeneous nodal points were constantly making new connections yet 
none of them could be defined as the core or centre, a rhizome was gradually 
formed by them. Through being connected into one piece, several molar 
structures were set into aimless molecular escapes which, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s words, ‘escaped the binary organisation, the resonance apparatus, and 
the overcoding machine.’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 216) However, Deleuze 
and Guattari also point out that, ‘molecular escapes and movements would be 
nothing if they did not return to molar organisations.’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
216-217). The aim of making the work was to direct the molecular movements 
into a new molar structure. Through directing the chaotic and unpredictable 
connection made between the nodal points by handling paint and photographs, 
the rhizome would be turned into a new stable state. 
 
However, similar to the practices discussed above, as the initial intentions were 
constantly shifted by the lines of flight created by handling paint and photographs, 
I did not have the total control in directing the connections. For example, as the 
first step of the initial plan was to visually connect the new entered territory of 
brutality and horror with the initial objects generated from the nostalgic reverie 
such as the game and the community, photographs of the battle’s archaeological 
site, which was a burial ground of masses of human bones, were collected and 
made into a collage at the beginning of the practice (Fig.24). According to the 
initial plan, this collage would then be de-and-reterritorialised by another layer of 
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collage using the photographs of the computer game and the community. 
However, as I had never been to that archaeological site, the photographs that I 
collected were all taken by different people at different times. Although the 
collected photographs shared the same subject, combining them together 
unexpectedly became a process of making connections between individual 
objects, incoherent images and past moments which had the potential of creating 




Fig.24 The collage of photographs of the archaeological site, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, 
photographic collage, 60 x 105cm, pp.65-66 of the portfolio. 
 
Instead of pursuing one of these approaches, the practice was consciously turned 
back to the initial plan. By collaging a selection of cut photographs of the 
computer game and the community on top of the image of human bones, direct 
visual connections between several objects generated from the nostalgic reverie 
were made. Since both layers of the photographs were not organised by a 
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predetermined centre and were comprised of heterogeneous elements, the 
second layer of collage could be seen as an encounter between two rhizomes. 
As the cut photographs were associated with personal, beautiful memories 
whereas the collage of the human bones expressed a sense of strangeness, 
brutality and horror, this encounter between the two rhizomes created multiple 
layers of differences through handling which the painting and nostalgic reverie 
could enter unexpected territories.  
 
From another perspective, the cut photographs of the game and community were 
like settlers from other cultures that tried to impose their warm personal memories 
to the brutal ‘new land’. However, when discussing the encounter between 
rhizomes, Damian Sutton and David Martin-Jones use the metaphor of colonial 
relationship to indicate that,  
 
‘This process of mapping contained a mutual process of becoming, as the 
colonisers adapted to their new lands, and the new land to their 
colonisers…while a dominant colonial power will often change as its 
rhizome comes into contact with another, the other, weaker rhizome is often 
absorbed, or forcefully reterritorialised by its culture.’ (Sutton and Martin-
Jones, 2008: 7)  
 
Although the two sets of photographs were mutually influencing each other in 
general, as the photographic collage of human bones were in dominant position, 
the fragments of the computer game and the community’s photographs that 
scattered on top of it were indeed ‘absorbed, or forcefully reterritorialised’ by the 
strange and serious sense of brutality and horror. 
 
The initial nostalgic reverie and the memories related to it that could be triggered 
by looking at the cut photographs were hence ruptured and the collage did not 
create a centre within the rhizome. However, as the practice was aiming for new 
molar structures such as new interpretations of other memories rather than 
116 
 
visualising or representing the nostalgic reverie, I did not try to revive the nostalgic 
reverie by adding more cut photographs of the game and community to the 
unbalanced juxtaposition. By making a painting directly on the collage, the two 
rhizomes were merged into a new entity (Fig.25). The two layers of photographs 
and the painting, while could be seen as three rhizomes on their own, could also 
be seen as three nodal points from a different perspective. Through making these 
nodal points into new connections, the rhizome could achieve a new state in 
which the unbalanced juxtaposition between the two sets of photographs could 
be dismantled or shifted. 
 
 
Fig.25 Part One of The Labyrinth, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings on 







Fig.26 Detail of Part One of The Labyrinth, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings 
on photographic collage, 60 x 105cm, pp.64-69 of the portfolio. 
 
However, as Barbara Bolt says, handling paint has its own momentum, its own 
rhythm, and intensity that could lead the painter into a state in which she/he no 
longer have any awareness of making decisions (Bolt, 2006: 1). Although the new 
connections between the two sets of photographs and painting were largely 
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formed by the painting which was made under my intention, because handling 
paint had its own logic of becoming, I could not totally decide and control how the 
formations of these connections. For example, although I consciously made the 
decision of using red and yellow to start the painting, as the photographic collage 
was an uneven surface and the first layer of paint was pressed on the collage by 
a roller, the visual outcomes were uncontrollable and unforeseeable. Under the 
coherent painted image, some parts of the photographic images were completely 
covered, some parts of the photographic images could still be seen through the 
colours, and some parts of the photographic images were completely untouched. 
The image as an entity was unexpectedly shifted into a patchwork woven by the 
painting, the painted photographic images, and the untouched photographic 
images. The juxtapositions and connections between these images in turn 
influenced my next step of practice. The connections between the painted and 
the different photographic images were enriched and adjusted through the mutual 
influences between my intention and the pratical logic of handling materials. 
Although it was under my conscious direction, the practice could still be seen as 
rhizomatic as the nodal points (i.e. paint and the different photographs) could 
always find ways to make connections outside my intentions.  
 
However, as Simon O’Sullivan points out when discussing the relationships 
between connectivity and creativity that, ‘It is important to remark that not all 
connections will be as equally relevant, or as strategically useful’ (O’Sullivan, 
2006: 17), not all brushtrokes and collages could be an effective step in finding 
the new molar structure that the practice was aiming for. Being incited by the 
practice, my memory and affect were also put in molecular movements which ran 
away from the initial nostalgic reverie and constantly reaching other memories 
and thoughts. These encountered elements became another layer of nodal points 
that could join the development of the work’s rhizome. But as they were not 
equally relevant in promoting the development of the work’s rhizome, only two of 
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these newly found, or created elements were added to the works. One was some 
sentences from a story book called Fables of the Warring States written by an 
author whose pen name was Rhetor and the other was a 1997 Japanese cartoon 
produced by Toei Animation and directed by Daisuke Nishio called The Kindaichi 
Case Files. Neither element had a logical connection with the work at that 
moment because while the first layer of the work was an image of a mass of 
human skeletons from a brutal massacre, the triggered sentences from the story 
book were all amusing ones. Unlike the sentences which could be argued as 
having some connections with the skeletons because the book that they were 
from was about that battle and massacre, the cartoon had no obvious connection 
with the work at all. 
 
Out of all the objects triggered into my mind during painting, these two, although 
illogical, possessed something that particularly incited me to connect them to the 
work. I did not try to find or create a rational explanation for these illogical 
triggering and connections, as O’Sullivan argues that, compared with making 
sense of the world, art is ‘more involved in experience, in pushing forward the 
boundaries of what can be experienced’ (O’Sullivan, 2001: 130). Rather, the 
connections between the work, the sentences and cartoons were seen as an 
encounter as the illogicality ruptured my habitual ways of thinking about these 
objects and created the possibilities of merging them into one piece. By writing 
the sentences and collaging cut stills from the cartoon on the work, several new 
sets of mutual rupturing were created, and the rhizome of the work was 
deterritorialised for another time. 
 
At this point, the initial nostalgic reverie had experienced three main layers of de-
and-reterritorialisation. The first layer was the attempts of consolidating the 
objects from it; the second layer was to visualise and merge these objects into 
one piece through manipulating paint and photographs; and the final layer was 
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the encounter with the sentences and cartoon. While the nostalgic reverie, which 
was a molar structure, had been turned into a centreless rhizome which could 
develop into other thoughts and ideas; the state of my memory and affect had 
also been shifted from a bittersweet or sentimental longing for a beautified and 
imagined image of a period of his past into thinking about the relationships 
between several unexpectedly triggered elements. As a result, neither the work 
nor the practice could be defined as representational as they were not ordered 
by a predetermined model or image.  
 
From the viewers’ perspective, viewing the work at any stage of the process could 
be an effective viewing because the viewing was to create thoughts and affective 
movements by articulating their own memory and affect with the work rather than 
finding a predetermined conclusion. But from my perspective, the practice 
needed to continue as it would be a pointless material experiment if a new centre 
did not emerge in the work, or the rhizome. However, the practice did not continue 
to be the process of expanding the rhizome of the work and taking in new 
heterogeneous elements. Instead, the focus of the following practice was 





Fig.27 Photographs with the blue sky, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic on photographic 





Fig.28 Detail of The Labyrinth, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings on 
photographic collage, variable size, pp.61-78 of the portfolio. 
 
Even with a conscious direction like this, handling paint, photographs, and writing 
still found their ways of escaping from my intention and reached unexpected 
results. For example, during another layer of collaging, several new photographs 
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of the community which included blue sky were selected. Different from the 
previous photographs of the community which were cut and only the parts of 
buildings were used in the collage, the new ones were being collaged integrally 
on the work. What I did not (and could not have) foreseen was that the repeated 
images of the blue sky (Fig.27-28) formed a line of flight which led my mind out 
of the chaotic and aimless connections of the rhizome and entered a new territory. 
Unlike the previous encounters in which certain objects such as the sentences 
and cartoon were triggered into my mind and joined the work’s rhizome as nodal 
points for the connections to expand, what was shifted by the photographs of blue 
sky was my affective state. The anxious and constrained affective state of the 
initial nostalgic reverie was shifted into a peaceful and easy emotion. With this 
new triggered emotion as a starting point, objects from memories of other periods 
of times were triggered into my mind and formed a different nostalgic reverie. 
 
Similar to Marcel Proust’s description of how he suddenly encountered the 
memory and emotion of a period of his past by tasting a madeleine cake (1992: 
60-64), this shifting was sudden and thorough. Finding and collaging the 
photographs with blue sky on the work was like an act that unexpectedly created 
an exit for the nostalgic reverie which was like a moving labyrinth at that moment. 
However, as this act was based on the practice of Part One which was a process 
of territorialisation through which my initial nostalgic reverie was transformed into 
several images of objects which were then being connected into a new image, 
the ‘door’ was not directly created on the initial nostalgic reverie. If it was before 
the practice that I had looked at the photographs with blue sky, my affective state 
might not have shifted in the same way. From a physical and practical viewpoint, 
collaging the photographs with blue sky was another connection made during the 
process of de-and-reterritorialising the initial nostalgic reverie just like collaging 
another photograph or making another brushstroke on the work. In Simon 
O’Sullivan’s words, this connection between the painting and the photographs of 
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blue sky was more ‘relevant, or strategically useful than the others’ (O’Sullivan, 
2006: 17) in shifting the initial nostalgic reverie. 
 
From Sean Watson’s perspective, this relevant connection was achieved by a 
process of actualisation (Watson, 1998: 7) through which the parts of the 
photographs that interested me (i.e. the blue sky) were selected and made into a 
temorary articulation (i.e. the new affective state) with my memory and affect at 
that moment. From a neuroscientific perspective, Watson points out that 
actualisation is the channel through which people create conscious experiences 
in general, as he says, ‘The brain and nervous system comprise a machine which, 
amongst other things, actualises consciousness by selecting, from this totality, 
that which is of relevance for the conscious exercise of will’ (Watson, 1998: 7). 
Furthermore, by citing the works of Henri Bergson and Gerald M. Edelman, 
Watson indicates that memory plays a vital role in the creation of conscious 
experience (Watson, 1998: 9). If seeing the image during a painting practice as a 
totality, then in order to make the next brushstroke, the painter needs to actualise 
the image that she/he has painted and find out the parts of the image that need 
to be adjusted. The sudden change in my state of memory and affect in this case 
resulted in a rupture in how I perceived the painting that I was making. As the 
new state had different focuses and interests, the painting would be perceived 
from a different perspective. As a result, the previous practice which progressed 
under the struggle between a rational continuity of my intention and the 
uncontrollable practical logic was cut off by the shifting in states.  
 
Instead of the developments of the Part One, the new actualised thoughts and 
emotions by perceiving the painting under the new state in memory and affect 
would be the start of a piece that did not directly connect to it. Therefore, 
continuing to paint on Part One would be to cover it with a new piece rather than 
to extend the rhizome of the work. Although based on O’Sullivan’s theory of 
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encounter, rupture could also be argued as a kind of development for it leads to 
new modes of seeing and thinking the subjects (O’Sullivan, 2006: 1), as the 
painting of Part One needed to stay as an entity so that it could be made into 
connections with paintings of other parts, it was kept visible and intact. This 
means, by encountering the photographs of blue sky, the practice generated by 
the initial nostalgic reverie unexpectedly came to an end. Therefore, instead of 
creating an understanding or interpretation for the initial nostalgic reverie, 
painting practice in Part One developed it into a new state. 
 
Although it was started from a newly encountered affective state, the practice of 
Part Two was not fundamentally different from the practice of Part One. Collaging 
the photographs of blue sky on the work was an act that unexpectedly created an 
exit for a moving labyrinth, but what this exit led to was another labyrinth in 
becoming in which no object was static nor could be cleanly separated from the 
others. Similar to the initial nostalgic reverie which went through several phases 
of consolidation in order to generate the concrete images of objects, the new 
affective state was also an undividable bloc rather than the collection of some 
individual objects, and its identifying objects also required further coding and 
territorialisation.  
 
From Henri Bergson’s viewpoint, it might not be correct to divide elements such 
as affect, memory and painting practice into different parts as they could be seen 
as duration (durée) which is a succession without distinction in which no former 
states can be recurred (Bergson, 2001: vii). As discussed previously, 
encountering the photographs of blue sky divided the practice into two parts, or 
two phases by creating a gap within it. In order to create connections between 
the two works from the two practices, the relationships between the practices 
before and after the encounter need to be interrogated, especially the question 
of whether the practice of Part Two should be seen as directly generated from 
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Part One or a separated new practice.  
 
As the new affective state was actualised from the nostalgic reverie, the two were 
indeed inseparable although the nostalgic reverie could not be revived. In terms 
of the painting methods, there was no obvious developing relationship between 
the two parts. The two paintings went through the exact same serial of de-and-
reterritorialisation for I used the same methods and procedures of Part One in the 
practice of Part Two. In both cases in the first step, the affective state was 
consolidated into several images of objects; by finding the photographs and 
collaging them into one piece, these images were then merged into a new 
centreless rhizome; and through making a painting on the collage, I tried to direct 
the unforeseeable development of the rhizome into an unknown molar structure.  
 
There were differences between the two works, but they were mainly in the 
contents and visual effects of the two images. For example, in the practice of Part 
Two, with the new affective state as the ‘amorphous soup of becomings’ (Holland, 
2013: 56), images of several objects such as a fishing harbour, palm trees, and 
a walk by the sea were generated. Following the same methods and procedures 
(i.e. finding and collaging photographs), these newly consolidated objects were 
made into a centreless collage that could be seen as a visual access to my 
memory and affect at the moment. Through being painted, this collage, or 
rhizome was then directed towards a molar structure. The paints were also mainly 
being pressed on the collage by a roller, only in Part Two the colours were 
different degrees of blue rather than red and yellow as they were in Part One. 
Finally, and most importantly, because the painting in Part One included writing, 
in order to maintain the visual continuity, I deliberately thought of some lyrics from 
a song called Peaceful Easy Feeling (1972) by the American band The Eagles 
that particularly stood out in my mind under that affective state and wrote them 




Fig.29 Part Two of The Labyrinth, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings on 
photographic collage, 30 x 84cm, pp.70-72 of the portfolio. 
 
 
Fig.30 Detail of Part Two of The Labyrinth, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings 




In this way, while visually speaking, the works of the two practices each has its 
own uniqueness and could even be exhibited separately, the repeated methods 
and procedures seemed to have ignored or even erased the unique potential of 
the two very different affective states in becoming images and directed them into 
a homogeneous territory. The question of what the practices did to the affective 
states emerged. With the same methods and procedures, did they succeed in 
‘pushing forward the boundaries of what can be experienced’ (O’Sullivan, 2001: 
130) in each practice of painting a nostalgic experience or did they only create a 
structure that shaped all practices of painting a nostalgic experience into the 
same form? Both practices were non-representational as neither aimed to 
visualise a predetermined prototype that represented the nostalgic reverie. What 
this question really aims to find out is, did the same methods and procedures 
create a new model that would bring the later non-representational practices of 
shifting nostalgic experiences back in a representational track by predetermining 
how the non-representational practices should be conducted. 
 
Based on Deleuze’s distinction between generality and repetition, the question is 
about whether the repeated methods and procedures were generality or 
repetition. In Difference and Repetition (1994), Deleuze points out that generality 
belongs to the order of laws which determines only the resemblance of the 
subjects ruled by it. By contrast, repetition ‘can always be 'represented' as 
extreme resemblance, or perfect equivalence, but the fact that one can pass by 
degrees from one thing to another does not prevent their being different in kind’ 
(1994: 1-2). As generality ‘expresses a point of view according to which one term 
may be exchanged or substituted for another’ while ‘repetition is a necessary and 
justified conduct only in relation to that which cannot be replaced’ (1994: 1), the 
key to this question was whether the created relationships between the objects 




The works of the two parts shared certain similarities in visual form, but through 
examining the relationships between the elements within the two works, it is easy 
to see that the relationship between the elements in each work, such as the one 
between the selected photographs, the one between the photographs and paint, 
and the one between the writings and the images, were different and could not 
be exchanged for another. In other words, the resemblance in visual form did not 
function as a ‘law’ which erased the particularities of the elements generated from 
the different affective states and organise them into the same structure. Although 
I deliberately repeated the form of the work in Part One in Part Two, as both works 
were not made to realise a predetermined model, the connections between the 
photographs, paint, and writings in each work created different effects. As the 
sentences and the photographs had the same subject in the work of Part One, 
they created a kind of illustrative relationship. By contrast, while the photographs 
used in Part Two were taken in China in late 2010s, the lyrics written within the 
painting were from an American band’s work from the early 1970s. As a result, 
the combination between the two elements seemed irrational. In O’Sullivan’s 
words (2006: 1), the combination between writing and photographs in Part One 
was a recognition, whereas the combination in Part Two was an encounter. 
 
Another example was the combination of photographs. In Part One, the used 
photographs were of the site of an ancient battlefield which included a mass of 
human bones, a community that I lived in, a computer game that I played, and 
stills of a cartoon. As there was an obvious irrelevance between these elements, 
collaging them together directly created chaos and confusion. However, in Part 
Two, although I knew that the photographs of the fishing harbour, the palm trees, 
and the walk by the sea were taken in different places at different times, as they 
could naturally form a scene of seaside landscape, even they were being 
deliberately made into an irrational and centreless image, the sense that the 
image was one piece was still stronger than the collage in Part One. Opposite 
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from the cases of combinations between photographs and writings, making the 
photographic collage in Part One could be seen as a process of encounter 
whereas the process in Part Two was more of a recognition. While creating a 
visual continuity that merged the works of two parts into one piece, the repeated 
methods and procedures also created the room for differences to generate.  
 
I deliberately kept the form of the work from Part One by repeating the same 
methods and procedures, the work of Part Two still found a way of creating its 
own particularity. As the practice of the first part was a series of de-and-
reterritorialisation that led my memory and affect to an unexpected new state 
rather than the visualisation of a prototype of the nostalgic reverie, it should be 
seen as a test, or exploration. Accordingly, in Deleuze’s words, repeating the 
same methods and procedures indeed repeated an ‘unrepeatable’ (Deleuze, 
1994: 1), as even the first time of practice was not conducted according to a 





Fig.31 Part Three of The Labyrinth, Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings on 
photographic collage, 90 x 105cm, pp.73-78 of the portfolio. 
 
In this way, with the repeated methods and procedures, the practice in Part Two 
encountered its own line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9) and entered 
Part Three (Fig.31). Unlike Part One in which the line of flight emerged during the 
selection and collage of photographs, the line of flight in Part Two was generated 
from the words. While writing the selected lyrics on the painting, other songs such 
as Suede’s Beautiful Ones (1996), Shin Band’s One Night in Beijing (2002) and 
Bon Jovi’s Santa Fe (1990) and Make a Memory (2007) were unexpectedly 
triggered into my mind and some of them became the pivots centred around 
which a nostalgic reverie of the period of time when I often listened to them was 
triggered. This was another encounter which shifted both the state of my memory 
and affect and the repeated methods and procedures. Because the nostalgic 
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experience in Part Three was triggered by the writings which in the previous two 
practices were the last step, to a certain degree, practice in Part Three reversed 
the procedures of the previous two parts. Instead of repeating the procedure of 
starting the work with selecting and collaging photographs, the practice in Part 
Three started with selecting and collaging lyrics. 
 
As the writings in both previous two parts were the last step of the practice, they 
did not extend the rhizome they belonged to by taking new elements in through 
making connections with them. Therefore, without being de-and-reterritorialised 
by the elements triggered by them, they were able to remain the identity of one 
written work such as sentences from a storybook and lyrics from one song. 
However, as the nostalgic experience in Part Three was triggered by the lyrics, 
painting in this part was led by the writing. Therefore, while triggering other 
objects such as places and events, the initial lyrics were also being de-and-
reterritorialised by the objects that they triggered. Along with the images of places 
and events, words from other written works such as lyrics of songs such as 
Radiohead’s Creep (1992) and Street Spirit (1996) and some lines from a 2010 
documentary film directed by Zhang Neixian called No Country For Young Man 
were also triggered into my mind and joined the rhizome as new nodal points. 
The rhizome of paint, photographs, and words in Part Three was enrichened as 
the writings boosted the potentials of creating encounters by bringing in another 
level of heterogeneity.  
 
This expansion in rhizome then created new techniques in handling paint. Unlike 
the previous two practices in which the paint was mainly pressed on the 
photographs, painting in Part Three involved covering the photograph collage 
with an equally thin layer of paint (Fig.32) and dripping paint on the photographic 
collage (Fig.33). In this way, the methods and procedures set by the practice in 
Part One gradually found their way of generating new methods through repetition. 
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Although I handled paint, photographs, and writings in all three parts of practices, 
instead of organising them in a set structure, the repeated practice set them in 




Fig.32 The equally thin layer of paints covering the photographic collage in The Labyrinth, 
Rongwei Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings on photographic collage, variable size, pp.78 





Fig.33 Detail of paint dripped onto photographic collage in The Labyrinth, Rongwei 
Zhang, 2019, acrylic and writings on photographic collage, variable size, pp.78 of the 
portfolio. 
 
None of these materials nor any one of the nostalgic reveries could be an ‘organ’ 
that perform a set function within this practice. Through perceiving the images 
during the process, the becoming of my memory and affect was directed by this 
rhizomatic handling of materials. As a task of exploring the question of how 
painting can address nostalgia through a rhizomatic exploration of memory and 
affect, The Labyrinth was a project that combined the material led exploration of 
The Barnes Series and finding the Body without Organ in dealing with multiple 
nostalgic reveries in Wish You Were Here 100. The work does not visually present 
a patchwork made within my memory. Instead, it sees my memory and affect as 
an entity and functions as both the trigger and the effect of the becoming of the 
becoming. Therefore, as long as I am in becoming, the work could be continued. 
It directs and transforms a person’s becoming in memory and affect into a static, 
centreless, two-dimensional image by viewing which other people can find new 
experiences by connecting their own memories to it. 
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Chapter Four: Conclusion 
 
4.1 What is Painting a Nostalgic Experience 
 
As concluded in Chapter One: Section 1.7, nostalgic reverie in this project is 
conceptualised as an image of the past that the person longs for. Because 
nostalgic reverie is centreless and formed by the connections between 
heterogeneous elements such as memory, affect and the person’s present 
circumstances, it can be seen as a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987). 
Psychological research has indicated that nostalgic experience, which is the 
process of dealing with a nostalgic reverie, is non-repeatable (Zhao, 2005) and 
its effects are unpredictable (Kaplan, 1987: 465; Best and Nelson, 1985: 221-
233). Hence, nostalgic experience is also rhizomatic, as it is not organised by any 
predetermined structure. 
 
Based on Henri Bergson’s philosophy of actualisation (1991) and duration (2001), 
nostalgic reverie is seen as an actualised present of the person rather than the 
re-presentation of her/his past. Bergson points out that when we perceive an 
object, only the elements that interest us could go into our consciousness (1991: 
36). The thing or totality that we perceive is defined as the virtual, and the 
consciousness we create by adjusting the selected elements is defined as the 
actual (Watson, 1998). This process of perceiving through selecting and adjusting 
is actualisation. The person’s memory is a main part of the virtual from which the 
nostalgic reverie (i.e. the actual) is actualised. However, as a person’s memory 
can be seen as a succession without distinction that only has the present state 
(Bergson, 2001: vii), the actualised nostalgic reverie should not be regarded as 
‘the past’ as it is created by actualising the present.   
 
Constantine Sedikides, Tim Wildschut and Denise Baden’s research points out 
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that the juxtaposition or comparison between the present and the past is the 
defining feature of nostalgia (Sedikides et al., 2004: 205-206). I argue that, as 
‘the past’ in nostalgia is actualised from the person’s present state in memory, 
affect and circumstances, it is also a part of the person’s present. Moreover, as it 
is beautified, imagined and non-repeatable (Zhao, 2005), ‘the past’ in a nostalgic 
experience is a new state of the person’s present. Therefore, the juxtaposition 
between the present and the past can also be seen as a confusion between the 
present and an illusion of the past. 
 
As the nostalgic reverie is a rhizome formed by the connections between the 
person’s actualised present circumstances, her/his actualised memories, 
imagination and affect, the process of dealing with a nostalgic experience (i.e. a 
nostalgic experience) can be seen as a process of shifting the connections 
between these heterogeneous elements. During such a process, new elements 
might join the rhizome and the connections between the involved elements might 
be reorganised.  
 
Painting a nostalgic experience should be considered rhizomatic rather than 
representational. It is not a linear process of directing the nostalgic experience by 
handling paint or using the nostalgic reverie as the predetermined image for 
painting to depict. Barbara Bolt defines representationalism as a strict structure 
in which some predetermined theoretical models provide a blueprint for practice 
to realise (2004: 8). Painting a nostalgic experience in a representational way 
requires the painter to turn the nostalgic experience, which is a dynamic process 
of becoming, into a static image first and then use painting to visualise it. By 
predetermining the result of the painting, representationalism stymies rather than 
fosters creativity.  
 
Therefore, instead of being a blueprint for the practice to achieve, the painter’s 
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initial aim of the painting (e.g. visualising the nostalgic reverie) can be seen as a 
perspective of entering the rhizome of nostalgic experience. It starts the process 
of making connections between the physical materials and invisible elements but 
should not determine or control the following direction of these connections and 
influences. 
 
In discussing the material of painting, James Elkins points out that ‘paint incites 
motions, or the thought of motions, and through them it implies emotions and 
other wordless experiences’ (2000: 188). Barbara Bolt argues that handling paint 
has its own logic that cannot be totally controlled by the painter (2004: 4-5). Based 
on these viewpoints, painting a nostalgic experience is defined as a process of 
handling the becoming of the nostalgic experience through handling paint. The 
painting is created through the mutual influences between handling paint and the 
nostalgic experience. While the memories and emotions of the nostalgic 
experience influence the painter’s practice, the painter’s nostalgic experience is 
shifted by the act of handling paint. In this way, painting a nostalgic experience 
becomes a practice that does not solely aim to explore memory and affect. Apart 
from triggering different memories and affective movements, painting a nostalgic 
experience also has the potential of generating new thoughts, ideas, methods 
and techniques for painting.   
 
4.2 Finding One: The Painter’s Aim in Rhizomatic Painting Practice 
 
This project explored the question of how painting can address nostalgia through 
a rhizomatic exploration of memory and affect. The first main finding from the 
practice is how the painter should use her/his aims in rhizomatic painting practice.  
 
As a rhizome is centreless and always shifting (Sutton and Martin-Jones, 2008: 
6) and both nostalgia and painting practice in this project are defined as a rhizome, 
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practice with a single clear aim might be difficult to reach the nub of the research 
question. However, this does not mean that the painter should not have any clear 
aim in the task of painting nostalgia rhizomatically. The key of fitting the painter’s 
aim in the rhizomatic painting practice is in the transcendence of 
representationalism, because in representationalism, the painter’s aim is the 
blueprint, or the sole centre that orders the practice. Hence, a representational 
practice would make it difficult to create a line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 9) that shifts the nostalgic experience as it is restricted in a known territory. 
  
The discussion of the three projects in Chapter Three has indicated that, in 
exploring a nostalgic experience, the painter’s aims that trigger the painting yet 
do not predetermine a result for it could be the starting points from which the 
painter participates yet does not control the becoming of the nostalgic 
experiences through handling paint. This type of aim could be represented by the 
initial aim of The Labyrinth (Fig.22). The aim was to visualise the object of the 
nostalgic reverie through making a painting on selected photographs. As I did not 
predetermine what the work should be like, handling the materials gradually took 
my mind into a different nostalgic reverie. Instead of being a blueprint that 
determined how the becoming of the nostalgic reverie should be, the initial aim 
of The Labyrinth was like an entrance through which I entered the nostalgic 
reverie and manipulated its becoming with painting. 
 
Practices started by this type of aim shift the nostalgic reverie’s becoming by 
enriching its heterogeneity and potential of connectivity yet do not predetermine 
where the shifting is heading. Accordingly, through these aims, the painter’s 
rational thoughts and the rhizome’s aimless becoming could reach a balancing 
point in which the two parts mutually influence each other. In this way, the 




Nostalgic experience in this project is seen as a process in which the person 
deals with an imagined image of the past. According to Constantine Sedikides et 
al.’s research, the image of the past cannot be the reappearance of some bygone 
facts, as it is ‘centred around personally relevant events, is dipped in affect’ 
whereas reminiscence and autobiographical memory are acts of remembering 
specific events in one’s life that do not have to be, and typically are not, important 
or affect-laden, including the order of their occurrence. (Constantine Sedikides et 
al., 2004: 205).  
 
Therefore, nostalgia is a state in which the person uses their memory and affect 
as raw material to create a scene to fulfil their present psychological needs. This 
beautified and imagined past that the person longs for is defined as the nostalgic 
reverie in this project and the process of re-achieving stability in memory and 
affect through dealing with the juxtaposition or comparison is defined as the 
nostalgic experience. As a nostalgic experience involves the becoming and 
connections between several heterogeneous elements such as memory, affect, 
imagination, and present environment that the person is in, it can be seen as a 
rhizome based on Deleuze and Guattari’s definition (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
7-10).   
 
As a rhizome is centreless and in constant shifting (Sutton and Martin-Jones, 
2008: 6), exploring a nostalgic experience with painting could be seen as a task 
of participating the shifting of this rhizome by deliberately making connections 
between physical materials such as paint and photographs and the rhizome. By 
enriching the heterogeneity of the rhizome, handling paint and photographs could 
foster the rhizome’s potential in creating connections. These new connections 
between physical materials and objects in the nostalgic reverie create lines of 




However, this shifting might be difficult to achieve if the practice was conducted 
in a representational way. Based on Barbara Bolt’s discussion, the word 
representation has two main meanings. It can be understood as re-presentation 
which ‘stands in the place of an absent object’ (Bolt, 2004: 16), and 
representationalism which is a model of thinking and practice in which a picture 
is predetermined as the prototype, model or schema that orders the person’s 
thinking and behaviours (Bolt, 2004: 18). It is the representationalism that this 
project aims to transcend. With representationalism, the nostalgic reverie which 
is centreless and always shifting would be transformed into a static picture with 
clear centres that narrates the beautified and imagined past that the painter is 
longing for before they start to paint. The destination of the practice is 
predetermined hence the initiatives of the practice in directing the becoming of 
the nostalgic experience were largely reduced as which objects could be selected 
in the painting and what these objects are like is predetermined by the 
transformed picture. In other words, there is a gap that cleanly separates the 
subject (i.e. nostalgia) and practice in representational practice therefore the 
practice is restricted in the role of following rather than exploring. As the practice 
is heading to a known destination, finding encounters (O’Sullivan, 2006: 1) that 
would rupture the nostalgic experience might be difficult during the process. 
 
In order to transcend representationalism, painting in this project should be seen 
as a way of participating the nostalgic experience’s becoming rather than the 
means of visualising a predetermined picture. Therefore, the painter’s aim needs 
to be interrogated. Practicing rhizomatically does not mean that the painter should 
deliberately practice without any clear aim. When discussing the co-existence of 
molar and molecular movement (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 216-217), Deleuze 
and Guattari indicate that even during the process of realising a predetermined 
structure, the elements could still start an aimless escape that ends in a different 
and unexpected structure. Even in the cases of practicing with a clear rational 
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aim such as the first step of Her Writings (Fig.12) in which I deliberately used 
photographs to visualise certain objects from the nostalgic reverie, unexpected 
movements in thoughts and affect triggering could still happen and create new 
possibilities for the becoming of the nostalgic experience.  
 
Therefore, rhizomatic practice does not reject rational aims in general. The ones 
that trigger practice (e.g. I will try to visualise the selected objects from the 
nostalgic reverie by making a photograph collage) yet do not function as the 
blueprint for practice to realise (e.g. the work should only include object A, B, and 
C, and they should be painted realistically) are important in rhizomatic painting 
practice as it is through them that the painter achieves a point where her/his 
rational thinking and the aimless becoming of the rhizome could be balanced. In 
this way, as the two forces that direct the becoming of the nostalgic experience 
are mutually influencing each other, what the nostalgic experience would become 
is a question that cannot be answered simply by thinking. Also, answering it with 
painting becomes a way of ‘pushing forward the boundaries of what can be 
experienced’ (O’Sullivan, 2001: 130). 
 
As Damian Sutton says, Deleuze and Guattari did not establish the rhizome to 
replace the arborescent structure which has a clear centre. Instead, the rhizome 
should be seen as a forest that includes many individual trees (Sutton and Martin-
Jones, 2008: 4). If the process of creating a visual outcome (i.e. the effect) from 
a clear aim (i.e. the seed) is seen as a process of creating a ‘tree’, then what 
rhizomatic practice creates is indeed a ‘forest’ as the ‘seed’ (i.e. the painter’s initial 
aim) does not aim at any predetermined effect, hence what it creates could 
always be seen by the painter as a new ‘seed’ that leads to another effect. In this 
way, the painter’s rational thought is constantly in and out of the process of 
practice. As a result, the work could have multiple unplanned centres as The 
Labyrinth (Fig.22) and none of them could be defined as more fundamental than 
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the others.  
 
Instead of being the model for the painter to visualise, nostalgia becomes the 
starting materials used by the painter to create an image on its own that involves 
many centres or nodal points formed by heterogeneous elements. Accordingly, in 
viewing the work, viewers need to connect their own memory and affect to the 
work and create cognitive and affective movements of their own. 
 
4.3 Finding Two: Achieving New Affective States and New Connections 
between Memories 
 
From the painter’s perspective, exploring a nostalgic experience with rhizomatic 
painting has two functions. By articulating the nostalgic reverie with paint and 
photographs, rhizomatic painting practice can end the painter’s nostalgic 
experience and lead her/him to a new affective state. Also, through the handling, 
new connections between different parts of the painter’s memory could be made. 
 
Although Sedikides et al.’s research points out that nostalgia has positive 
functions such as solidifying and augmenting the person’s identity, helping the 
person to regenerate and sustain a sense of meaning of her/his life, and 
buttressing the person’s social connectedness (2004: 206-207), psychoanalytic 
theorist Roderick Peters argues that a person’s attempts to cope with her/his 
present circumstances might be seriously interfered by nostalgia (1985: 135). 
Therefore, in some cases, ending the nostalgic reverie might be necessary and 
this can be achieved by the rhizomatic practice of painting the nostalgic reverie.  
 
In Deleuze and Guattari’s words, the shift from a nostalgic reverie to a new 
psychological state is achieved through the line of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 9). Hence, the aim of the rhizomatic practice of handling paint and 
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photographs could be seen as to create a line of flight. One of the main points 
where line of flight could emerge was using photographs to re-present the objects 
in the nostalgic reverie. As discussed in Chapter One, Section 1.6, a photograph 
can re-present neither the photographed subjects nor the objects in the painter’s 
nostalgic reverie because while the photograph is a static documentation of a 
specific state of the subjects from a particular perspective, the actual subjects are 
in non-stopped becoming and the objects in the nostalgic reverie are newly 
constructed rather than the re-presentation of some facts that the person 
remembers. As the painter’s memory as an entity must be in a different state than 
it was at the moment of taking the photograph, even perceiving a photograph 
taken by the person herself/himself of the actual objects during the actual period 
of time that she/he is longing for might cause the emergence of unexpected 
thoughts and affects that have the potential of shifting the person’s nostalgic 
psychological state.  
 
James Elkins indicates that, ‘Paint incites motions, or the thought of motions, and 
through them it implies emotions and other wordless experiences’ (2000: 188). 
Handling paint based on the thoughts and emotions encountered by selecting 
photographs can be seen as a deliberately made articulation between the 
nostalgic reverie, the encountered thoughts and emotions, paint, and 
photographs. In this way, the initial nostalgic reverie becomes a nodal point based 
on which a bigger rhizome is made. By enriching the heterogeneity of this new 
rhizome, the articulations between memory, affects, paint and photographs boost 
this rhizome’s potential of creating connectivity.  
 
It is through the connections between these heterogeneous elements that the 
initial nostalgic reverie could be shifted into other states such as a conflict 
between facts and the nostalgic reverie as it happened in Hot and Damp, a City 
in Jungle, 1994, Guangzhou (Fig.18) and the memory of another period of time 
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as the case of finding the photographs with blue sky in The Labyrinth (Fig.22). In 
this way, in Bergson’s words, the initial nostalgic experience becomes a former 
state of the person’s memory (i.e. a duration) that cannot be recurred (2001: vii). 
With this rhizomatic tactic, painting can transcend the representational role of 
depicting a scene transformed from the nostalgic reverie and become an 
exploration that bring encounters to the painter.  
 
The achieved new affective state might involve new connections between 
different parts of the painter’s memory. For example, by encountering the 
photographs with blue sky, I entered the second part of practice in The Labyrinth 
(Fig.22). This shifting directly connected my memory that I dealt with in Part One 
(i.e. the ones that involved the computer game and the storybook) with my 
memory that functioned as the subject of Part Two (i.e. the ones that involved the 
palm trees and the sea). These two memories and the one of making the work 
formed a new territory in which the interpretation of any one of them would be 
influenced by the other two. Therefore, by taking the painter to a new affective 
state, exploring a nostalgic experience with rhizomatic painting also enriches the 
potential of the future becoming of the painter’s memory by creating new 
interpretations for the relative memories.  
 
4.4 Finding Three: A Body without Organ on its own 
 
As the painter’s memory is an undividable duration, and every nostalgic 
experience is a non-repeatable state of it, paintings that are generated from 
nostalgic experiences are naturally connected by a link. However, unlike the 
different states in memory which, according to Bergson, could not be separated 
into different individuals as they are different phases of a person’s duration 
(Bergson, 2001: vii), the paintings that generated from them are physically 
independent from each other. Therefore, arranging paintings of different nostalgic 
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experiences together can be seen as a way of creating new perspectives of 
looking at the painter’s memory by creating connections between the different 
phases of it. 
 
As discussed previously, with the rhizomatic tactic, every practice of painting a 
nostalgic experience would take the painter to a new state in memory and affect. 
Although the painting started from a nostalgic reverie, it must involve more than 
one memory or imagination and none of the them could be defined as the real 
centre of the painting. If seeing the arranged paintings as an entity, then no matter 
how the paintings are selected and arranged, there would be multiple centres, or 
focuses within this arrangement. Arranging the paintings could be seen as a way 
of turning the linear development of the painter’s memory into a flat, 
heterogeneous, and centreless patchwork. 
 
Moreover, as the painter’s memory would be in a different state when she/he 
finishes several paintings, perceiving the early pieces would generate new 
thoughts and emotions. Even for the painter herself/himself, perceiving the 
patchwork made with paintings generated from her/his previous nostalgic 
experiences would create something new rather than revive some of the previous 
states in memory and affect. The memories and affects that generated works are 
all from the painter, however she/he has no privilege in reading the work as 
she/he has to construct meanings or narratives from the connections between 
the images based on her/his memory at the moment of viewing. 
 
Although the image is static, because each viewing experience would be shaped 
by the viewer’s state in memory and affect at the moment, the painter would find 
unique centres from the patchwork and make non-repeatable connections 
between them. If seeing a painting as a body and the memories and imaginations 
as its organs, then instead of stripping the organs, arranging the paintings 
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together sets the organs into aimless Brownian motion. The patchwork hence 
becomes a body without organ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 30), and the viewing 
of the patchwork becomes a channel of creating new experiences rather than 
finding a predetermined conclusion. Therefore, the nostalgic experience can 
transcend the role of being a beautiful scene from the painter’s past that she/he 
desires for she/he to depict and become a force that incites the painter to create 
a body without organ by connecting pieces of her/his memory, affect, imagination, 
and visual materials such as paint and photographs. 
 
In this way, painting enters an area of ambiguity as the certainty in all its aspects 
is lowered by the rhizomatic practice. For example, while being an individual work, 
any one of the paintings of a nostalgic experience can be seen as a part of a 
bigger, ever changing rhizome, or body without organ. As nostalgia is a beautified 
and imagined past (Zhao, 2005), exploring it with rhizomatic painting practice 
involves both reminiscence and imagination, re-presentation and creation. 
Viewing the work for both the painter and other viewers means to perceive the 
work with a different state in memory and affect than the one that generated the 
work, as whether the work should be defined as ‘about the painter’s personal 
memory’ is debatable. By achieving these ambiguities, rhizomatic painting 
practice dissolves the original centres of the nostalgic experiences. As a result, 
nostalgia, which is often considered as sentimental or melancholic, can be turned 
into an unpredictable image by viewing which new cognitive and affective 




Painting a nostalgic experience means that the painter’s process of dealing with 
a nostalgic reverie is merged with a process of handling paint. With non-
representational practice which does not aim to visualise any predetermined 
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image, the merge of these two processes could lead to what Simon O’Sullivan 
defines as an encounter which means the consolidation of new thoughts, 
understandings or ideas after the rupture of an existing object (O’Sullivan, 2006: 
1). Through mutual interference, the two processes form a new rhizome with 
richer heterogeneity. This means, through the connections between the 
heterogeneous elements such as the paint, the painter’s aims of handling them 
and the objects in the nostalgic reverie, the potential in creating new thoughts 
and ideas is boosted.  
 
These connections might result in an image that neither visualises the nostalgic 
reverie nor realises other aims of the painter. The work could be a new entity on 
its own and perceiving it becomes another channel of gaining new thoughts, 
memories and affective movements. These new triggered elements could be or 
form lines of flight (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 9) along which the initial nostalgic 
experience enters new territories.  
 
If seeing a nostalgic experience as a rhizome, then painting it is a way of 
expanding and shifting it or merging it with other rhizomes. O’Sullivan indicates 
that the rhizome names a principle of connectivity and the making of connections 
could be understood as a key modality of creativity in general (O’Sullivan, 2006: 
17). Painting a nostalgic experience is an act of making connections between 
heterogeneous elements and its result is unpredictable. It might be the painter’s 
new memories and affect as it happened in The Labyrinth (Fig.22), new 
connections between different thoughts and memories as it happened in Untitled, 
2018 (Fig.10), or new methods and techniques for painting such as the gesso 
scraping method created by The Barnes Series (Fig.14). There might even be 
cases in which several of these results are created by one practice. Hence, 
instead of being bonded with certain subjects such as time and memory, painting 





In discussing the situation of the work of art in the contemporary world, Barbara 
Bolt indicates that, since we are constantly in the process of making it for 
exhibition, promoting it, analysing it and writing about it, all these multifarious 
activities, the work of art tends to be reduced to its equipmental-being (2004: 188). 
By indicating that both the process and result of painting a nostalgic experience 
can be surprising, this project shows that painting a nostalgic experience can be 
a way for painting to escape the instrumentalism pointed out by Bolt. In other 
words, through exploring a psychological phenomenon that focuses an illusion of 
the past, painting can embrace the endless possibilities of the future. Nostalgia 
has a long history of being conceptualised as a medical disease and a psychiatric 
disorder (Sedikides, 2008: 304-305). By being the subject of painting, it can 
become a repository of possibilities that foster creativity.  
 
Painting a nostalgic experience explores what the nostalgic experience can 
become rather than defining what the nostalgic experience is. Instead of seeing 
the nostalgic experience as a static object and analysing it from the perspective 
of an outsider, painting in this project merges into the nostalgic experience’s 
process of becoming. Painting and the nostalgic experience do not progress in 
parallel. They mutually shift each other through making connections between 
their elements. As a result, the gap between them becomes blurred, and defining 
whether the finished work is generated from painting or the nostalgic experience 
becomes difficult.    
 
Painting a nostalgic experience creates a new compound process of becoming. 
This points out a new role for painting, which is a process of creating new 
becoming through merging with an object’s becoming. By merging with the 
becoming of other objects, this new role of painting has the potential of creating 
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new connections between different thoughts and objects. The future of this role 
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